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CHAIRMAN MCCORQUODALE: Good morning and welcome to this Joint Interim Hearing on 
Mental Health. I'd like to introduce the other legislators who are here. We have Bruce 
Bronzan, who's Chair of the Assembly Select Committee on Mental Health, and Mr. Curtis 
Tucker, who's Chair of the Assembly Health Committee. Pleased to have them here this 
This is the first collaboration between the Assembly Select Committee on Mental 
Health and the Senate Subcommittee on Mental Health, but hopefully it will not be our 
last. We intend to continue to address the mental health needs of California residents 
through this hearing and future joint ventures. 
Our goal today is to hear from three panels comprised of individuals specifically 
invited because of their expertise and their representation of varying viewpoints on the 
various aspects of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act. The LPS Act, law since 1969, governs 
the methodology and procedure for civil commitment of persons with mental illness. Other 
similar procedures on involuntary commitment have been replaced in almost every other state 
in the Union based upon the LPS model. 
We do not expect to be able to arrive at a definitive conclusion regarding civil 
commitment issues as a result of today's short hearing. However, we hope that by 
addressing these issues we will be able to determine if indeed these are the issues that 
need legislative clarification during the upcoming legislative session. 
Following the hearing we plan to encourage the informal establishment of an ad 
hoc legislative work group comprised of the various elements of the mental health 
delivery and advocacy system. This group will be asked to expand upon the issues and 
recommendations presented at this hearing and will be asked to formulate specific legis-
lative proposals for revising the LPS Act if revision is seen as necessary. 
The resulting bill, or package of bills, would then be introduced during the early 
spring months of the 1985-86 legislative session. Presenting the package as two-year 
bills would give all interested parties ample time to review and make recommendations on 
the legislative package, and in order to work out the details over two years to ensure 
successful passage. 
We have with us today one of the three of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act. Alan 
Short is with us and I'm going to ask him to make some comments first and then we will 
go to Carl Elder from the Department of Mental Health, Barbara Lurie from the Los Angeles 
County Office of Patients' Rights to summarize the key provisions and procedures and the 
legal implications of the LPS Act. We then have a group of individuals who will follow 
that. I'd like to call on Senator Short to make some comments. 
SENATOR ALAN SHORT: I have Jim McDowell with me, Mr. Chairman and members of the 
committee, and he represents the right wing group that we have of volunteers trying to 
do something in the field of mental health. 
I'd like to thank you for inviting me to come today. It is true that the last 
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amendment that went in the bill named the bill. Actually, it's a Senate Bill. The work 
was done on the Assembly side and then we 
a copy of this report. 
in this , and I assume that you have 
I had a very innocent bill that raised the amount of money that the state was going 
to give counties and cities under the Mental Health Act I think ve 
changed it from 50 to 75 percent. I may be wrong on that It s been some time A very 
the innocent bill, just a question of whether the state could fund it We did get it 
Senate and through the committees on the side and it was acked Hr. 
Lanterman. I said, "Can't you get another bill. because need the money at 
the local mental health clinics." He said, "No, this is it 11 And he admitted, he said, 
"We need your support. Senator Teale on the Senate side is us and he's a 
doctor and he doesn't like the bill." I read the bill and I didn't like it myself. So 
we had some meetings in my office and, of course, Frank Lanterman was a gentleman that 
worked exceedingly hard in the field of mental health, and had the respect of every 
member of the Legislature. And if I him I wanted to do it. And 
he also had as a consultant to his committee one of the men I 
Boten. We have several judges from Stockton come up and discuss the 
ever met, Art 
aspects of the 
bill and a director of our community facility in San , and as a former 
supervisor you understand what you have to go a lot better than I do. So we pre-
pared many, many amendments to the bill And I was a little bit shocked at the ease with 
which Frank said yes, we'll take them. And thenwe gave him another block of amendments. 
Yes we'll take them. Well, those and we ran with the bill. 
I agree with you wholeheartedly that the bill needs a look at. How to get 
a person in a state hospital. But you understand, of course at the time did the 
study, and I assume you've read this report, and to me it was a marvelous because 
to the state it showed that people were not getting due process of law; were 
hospital because they had no other 
criminal, and it was time to stop it. 
to them. didn't have the rights of a 
There were in the state that 
didn't belong there. They were a nice Greek word that means caused." 
They were so low you were them ill. So this marvelous 
the LPS Act and I assume you have it. If you don't, I 11 be 
Now, this is the last 
Hentally Ill, 1959. Another of our six 
the office and some of them looked 
were written 
it but at least we 
was a background of 
it to you. 
but the staff in 
the job done. This last 
report, and they're hard to come by, I will leave with you, because on the last section 
of it it certainly gives my philosophy on this whole field And I • Mr. Bronzan, you 
will give it a good look, and Senator, because that's what I believe in. 
Now, I follow in the newspaper, like Will 
mental health field. Here you have the - I 
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that are happening in the 
sure that most of you get -
the California Journal, and the June issue - and I'll leave this with you, Mr. Chair-
man- it says, "Thousands Released, Few Treatment Facilities." "The state's first legis-
lative step along this road was in 1957. The Short-Doyle Act would set up a procedure 
for state funding of county programs. Next came the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (1967) 
which made it far more difficult to commit mentally ill persons to state hospitals and 
them there. The number of patients in the state hospitals declined dramatically but 
the community systems did not take up the slack," and it goes on and on, and that quotes 
Michael O'Connor that we had 37,500 in the state hospitals, now we have 5,000. I'm sure 
he's here today and can speak for himself. I did clip the article when he was appointed 
and it looked like we were going to get some pretty good action, but the article went 
on quoting a legislative consultant that said, "They really don't have much power anymore." 
Well, if they don't, that's a problem for the Legislature. 
But here we have "Psychiatric Dispute Overlinked Between Brain Drugs and Violence." 
This is the Sunday Examiner and Chronicle, June 10, 1984. It's interesting because -and 
your consultants or members of the Legislature might want to look into it - because, "If 
further studies confirm the theory it could have enormous implications because of a na-
tional trend toward releasing mental patients quickly from mental hospitals. The average 
day in most psychiatric hospitals is less than two weeks since Wyatt. And patients at 
Napa State Hospital, for instance, are drugged to the day of release," according to Napa 
psychiatrist, Dr. William Schwartzman. "The release patients are supposed to continue 
their medications as out-patients at community institutions but many don't and swiftly 
lose the therapeutic value of the drugs," and so forth. 
"The Issue is Hot." Here it is. Here's the Sacramento Union, May 7, in which they 
talk about street people. Dr. George Tarjan. This is from Los Angeles, Mr. Tucker, from 
your area. They're quoting UPI and it says, "Dr. Tarjan said that," - 11,000 partici-
pants at the 137th annual meeting and they're talking - "we must develop support and 
treatment facilities in the community for the patients that are released." The same thing 
in the San Francisco Chronicle, May 8. Here's an article from the Sacramento Union. 
"Some Social Security Checks May be Sent to Soup Kitchens." "Patients that get lost," 
said Margaret Hector, Secretary of Health and Human Services. This situation is abso-
lutely incredible! 
Here's one from the Sacramento Bee, September 29. "Father Files Lawsuit in Jail 
Assault on Retarded Son." It's being bought by an attorney by the name of Joseph Babich, 
and I guess that's the Joseph Babich that used to be in the Governor's office, then was 
a superior court judge. Mixed up--isolated at first and mixed up with other patients 
that abused him. 
I gave a talk in June to a group, the local mental health directors and a group of 
volunteers in Sacramento, and I said that volunteerism is an absolute must. Whether we 
like it or not, the state and the federal government cannot do all the things we'd like 
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them to do for the developmentally disabled and for the mentally ill and we need volun-
teers. That's why James McDowell is here. He's the best volunteer I ever met in my 
life, and he probably knows as much about the field of mental health as anybody I know, 
and is the father of a son who was a patient or a client in the Stockton State Hospital. 
And he is the chairman of our board of directors of a that we formed in 1975 
and has started programs throughout the state. When you visit your local bookstore and 
giftshop here in the Capitol, you're buying artifacts that are made by our students 
and they are paid for making these artifacts. It's of the treatment program. These 
are things under the guidance of people volunteers such as James McDowell, a local in-
surance man, third generation Sacramentan, is 
time, the kind of help that you need. 
done who devotes half his 
I took the liberty of calling Senator Wadie Deddeh about the problem after meeting--
the third meeting I had at the Department of Mental Health - if 
of the onganization - in which they were talking about people 
treatment. And I pointed out that this alliance - I think the 
's the term, the name 
lost and not getting 
who's president of 
one of the volunteer's group is from La Mesa in San County. Of course, Senator, I 
think you were mayor of one of the communities in the Mesa and I read this in the hand-
book this morning, and that you also had something to do with education. So you 
have a special feeling and a special expertise. Of course, Mr. Bronzan is a former 
supervisor, knows what the problem is at the level. 
Helen Teisher, and I think I recognized her in the audience - I haven't met her 
personally - I think she is here I discussed the matter with Senator Deddeh and 
asked him if it would be all right to send out a letter but work with his office on the 
letter, and this we have done. The letter went out gave a copy to the people 
at the Department of Mental Health and that it to the director so he 
would know where we're going, and a copy was delivered to Mr Bronzan' office. I don't 
know whether you've seen it or not , Senator, because it went out in the mail, it went 
to your district. So I'm sure that many of them haven't received it as But it 
expresses my feelings and Senator Deddeh's , and if I may, I'd like to read this 
and turn it over to Mr. McDowell for a few brief remarks because he has some feelings on 
this subject. But very briefly, I'm very happy you're this. In many instances 
it's extremely difficult to get people into the state that should be in there, 
that they're in there for such a brief amount of--a of time that there isn't 
enough time to identify their problems, and if 're for Social Security or 
other benefits, to make sure that an application is made so that get it and it fol-
lows him or her after they're released from the state I am concerned in the 
news when they state that 800 plus developmentally disabled are to be released from 
the state hospital system and I'm quite sure that there are insufficient homecare 
facilities to take them. 
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And the letter says, "Dear George," - addressed to Governor Deukmejian. You can 
see it's a friendly bipartisan letter, members of the committee. "A grievous situation 
faces our state administration, the Legislature. It is the unhappy plight of the home-
less mentally ill. I can't emphasize too strongly that this is not a partisan issue but 
a problem the legislators of good will of both parties will wish to address at this 
forthcoming session of the Legislature. California has been the leader in enlightened 
and effective legislation for the mentally ill and those with developmental disabilities. 
What we now accomplish can have a profound influence nationally for this is not a local 
issue but one of endemic national scope. 
"The enclosed article from the San Francisco Chronicle," and it's appendent to 
this, Mr. Chairman, and I'll leave a copy with you, "sets forth the concern of a special 
task force of the American Psychiatric Association. While the report of this task force 
is not yet ready for distribution, their recommendatios have been printed and I enclose 
a copy. 
"The statistics in California are admittedly guesswork, but the Community Mental 
Health Division of the Department of Mental Hygiene sets the number of homeless in 
California between 50,000 to 70,000, of which the number of chronically ill are as high 
as 37,500. They estimate that the number of chronically ill in the state is 170,000. 
This division says that of 44,000 jail inmates 16 percent or 7,000 are estimated to be 
seriously mentally ill, and many of these are mercy bookings. The American Psychiatric 
Association says that to address the problem of the homeless mentally ill we must begin 
with provisions for meeting their basic needs of food, shelter and clothing. They fur-
ther recommend an adequate number of graded (step-wise) supervised community housing 
settings. I strongly agree with these recommendations and hope that you share my feeling. 
"There are a number of organizations that are in a good position to provide infor-
mation about the homeless mentally ill. The League of California Cities and the County 
Supervisors Association should have information on arrest and jail commitments of the 
mentally ill, as well as information from their welfare departments and hospital facili-
ties on who might be mentally ill and homeless. 
I'm sending this letter to various state agencies and asking their cooperation in 
providing what information they may have and solicit suggestions on how to ascertain this 
information. I will keep you informed as to their replies and cooperation. 
"I am pleased to note that there is an Assembly committee that has been actively 
considering the problem of the mentally ill." And, of course, excuse me, Senator, and 
the Senate committee. "I commend them for the work and would particularly appreciate 
their interest in this problem. This is not a situation that can be wholly solved by 
providing counties with block grants, but needs the guidance and assistance of the state 
to provide an equitable and uniform program for the entire state. 
"I would appreciate your answer and I'm ready to assist you in any way I can. I 
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would appreciate your consideration of this problem when considering the budget. Respect-
fully and cordially." And it lists the various state , Mr. Chairman, that 
the letter went to, the last of course, by far not the least, all members of the Legis-
lature. I'd like to leave this with you because it has the Chronicle article and it also 
has the recommendations of the American Association Their report at this 
time has not as yet been printed. And I'll slow down if you want to hand that to the 
Chairman. Thank you. 
Mr. Chairman, here's the letter from the Citizens Action for Mental Health. 
I'm sure they're going to be testifying but this is a volunteer group, the kind of people 
we need to bring the problems to our attention and also, of course, to help lobby good 
meaningful legislation to relieve the situation. 
I'd like to introduce James McDowell. I noticed in the handbook that Mr. Tucker 
had gone to college in Italy. I was going to tell him that James McDowell was a machine 
gunner in Italy. I give you James McDowell. 
MR. JAMES MCDOWELL: I'll be very brief. My background is primarily in develop-
mental disabilities but it's a very good perspective to view the sister service system. 
I feel that the mental health system suffers from three distinct but very closely related 
defects. One defect is that the power structure is the providers. The power structure 
of mental health is the psychiatrist-related professionals and the hospitals. They, in 
my view, roll the system and whereas developmental disabilities is primarily a consumer 
directed system, though it has to struggle with like else. 
The other defect is the one that you're specifically 
and that is the issue of rights. In my humble view from 
have impacted your system, the rights are so strictly 
in these hearings 
a number of people who 
as to serve as an 
effective barrier to prevent people from needed services. And then in the case 
of too many of the professional , there is almost an of this denial 
as one more person turned away. The rights are also such that a revolving door is created, 
that the person enters the system, funds are expended upon the person and then they're 
immediately turned loose to encounter further personal or to just keep coming back 
through. The thing lacks integration. 
Money is desperately needed in the system but the mere of money into the 
system is just going to be more waste unless the money is integrated to accomplish mis-
sions. There is a tremendous amount of work to do and I think it starts right at the 
rights. I believe that the first right that the ill person has is not that he 
can refuse services, but that help can be and will be and must be offered and accepted. 
I appreciate, Alan, your inviting me to come. They my being brief. 
CHAIRMAN MCCORQUODALE: Thank you, Senator Short and Mr. McDowell. We appreciate 
your telling and setting the stage for our hearing 
from your view. 
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and to us a perspective 
SENATOR SHORT: Mr. Chairman, I think I speak for everyone in this room that we 
your attention to this problem. And while it may not have the glamour or the 
contributions that other fields of endeavor have, let me tell you this. In the 
five times that I ran for the Senate, my constituents, both parties, liked the fact that 
I did this and the longer I was in the Senate the more naughty things I guess I did, and 
I ran they kept pointing out terrible things about me and unfortunately some of 
them were true, Mr. Chairman. But, I never had a more loyal group of people supporting 
me than those people with a handicapped person in their household. And Mr. Chairman 
and Mr. Bronzan, that's one out of every four families. Thank you very much. 
CHAIRMAN MCCORQUODALE: Thank you. Now we'll have Carl Elder and Barbara Lurie. 
MR. CARL ELDER: Thank you very much. I want to tell both committees and their 
staff how much I appreciate the opportunity to give a very brief overview of what the 
Lanterman-Petris-Short Act currently endeavors. And I notice you have a very distin-
guished group of panels, members on the panels, to discuss some of their experiences 
and concerns and for that reason I will keep this extremely brief. 
As we know, the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act was first enacted in 1967. Its 
operativeness was delayed until July 1, 1969. I think when one looks through the 
Lanterman-Petris-Short Act one can understand why many of the provisions are as they are 
when you look at the basic intent that was behind the Act, and I'll just read off four of 
the express legislative purposes for enacting the LPS Act. One of them was to end the 
inappropriate and indefinite commitment of mentally disordered persons and eliminate 
disabilities. Another was to provide prompt evaluation and treatment of persons 
with serious mental disorders. Another was to guarantee and protect public safety. And 
a fourth purpose was to safeguard individual rights through judicial review. And I think 
all the periods of detention in the Act reflect those basic purposes as well as others. 
The central feature of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act is the provision of mech-
anisms for a limited and voluntary detention of mentally disordered persons for the 
purposes of evaluation and treatment, while at the same time providing these persons with 
enumerated rights and procedural safeguards. The detention mechanisms contained in the 
LPS Act are arranged in a progressive series of steps or stages with each subsequent 
generally providing for increasingly longer periods of possible detention, but im-
increasingly stringent procedural requirements. 
And I'll turn just briefly to a very brief discussion of each one of the basic 
periods of detention. The 72-hour period for evaluation and treatment. A person who 
as a result of mental disorder is a danger to others or to himself or herself or greatly 
disabled as defined- and that definition's very important -may be taken and placed in 
a designated by the county for evaluation and treatment for not more than 72 
hours. The person initiating this process may be a peace officer, member of the attending 
staff of an evaluation facility, or other designated professional person. I believe 
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there's also provision made for members of crisis teams in addition to those. An appli-
cation in writing by the initiating person is required stating that the initiating per-
son has probable cause to believe that the person meets the criteria for 72-hour deten-
tion and setting forth the description of the circumstances giving rise to such probable 
cause. No express provision is made for administrative judicial review during this 
72-hour period. 
Before the end of that 72-hour period or at the end of it, if a person being 
detained, if the treating staff determine that they continue to meet the criteria, that 
is as a result of a mental disorder, they are a danger to themselves or others, or gravely 
disabled, they may be certified for not more than 14 days of intensive treatment. The 
certification is made by two professional staff of the evaluation facility if they have 
found that the person meets the commitment criteria and the person has been advised of 
the need for but has not been willing or able to accept treatment on a voluntary basis. 
An automatic administrative review hearing of the certification is required within 
7 days of the initial detention unless the person requests a judicial review. And that 
was as a result of the Doe v. Gallinot case. In addition, specific provision is made 
for judicial review by habeas corpus, so that is before a superior court. 
There's an additional period of 14-day intensive treatment available for those 
who are suicidal, but other than that the next period of detention- and I'll just dis-
cuss this very briefly - is the 180-day post-certification for persons who are a demon-
strated danger to others. And so at this point we see how the Act more or less splits 
off. If you're a danger of--eminent danger -in fact, the term is no longer eminent -
a demonstrated danger to others, when you leave the 14~day period you have available a 
180-day period if you meet the criteria. There's specified conduct that must have been 
engaged in and you must present a demonstrated danger and it requires a filing with the 
court and a full judicial hearing on whether or not the person meets that criteria. And 
if they do, if they're a demonstrated danger to others, they may be detained for up to 
180 days, and at the end of that period, if they continue to meet that criteria, the 
detention period can be renewed. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRUCE BRONZAN: Is that hearing held in superior court as well? 
MR. ELDER: Yes it is. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: Similar to the other - the first time? 
MR. ELDER: Right. Similar to the petition for habeus corpus. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: Who represents the consumer here? The public defender most 
of the of the time? 
MR. ELDER: Generally it would be the public defender or a private counsel, and 
either the district attorney or the county counsel of the board of supervisors so desig-
nated represents the people. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: Just very quickly. The person who is defended a public 
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, they can bring, if they wish, testimony from a different psychiatrist or psy-
chologist or professional about the state of that person? 
MR. ELDER: Yes, they have a right to put on expert testimony. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: Is it generally the case that they don't because the cost of 
that would have to come out of the public defender's office and it's simply not 
for? Is that normally the case? 
MR. ELDER: I really can't speak to that. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: I'll ask somebody else then. 
MR. ELDER: So we have the periods of time - the 72-hour, the 14-day period - and 
then it's where the Act begins to split off and offer different options. As I say for 
those who are suicidal, there's a second 14-day period; for those who are demonstratively 
there's this 180-day period; but perhaps, and I hesitate to say the most impor-
tant period, but certainly one of the most significant periods of detention is the con-
servatorship process which is available for only those who are as a result of a mental 
disorder greatly disabled. And as I say, that is available for persons who are found to 
be gravely disabled as a result of a mental disorder. The proceedings for conservator-
are initiated by the county of residence and a detailed conservatorship investiga-
tion containing specified information is required. A court hearing or trial is also 
required. Provision is made for establishing a temporary conservatorship lasting no more 
than 30 days except when a jury trial is requested, pending final court disposition on the 
proceedings. The conservatorship can last no more than one year, although 
conservatorships can be established using the same procedures. And I've at-
tached also a copy of the provisions of I believe it's Section 5008 that define various 
terms in the LPS Act, and you'll note that under conservatorship there's three types of 
conservatorships, three definitions that are there. There's the standard definition and 
then there's one for what is often referred to, and you'll probably hear this term, Murphy 
conservatees. Those are those who are incompetent to stand trial and it's available in 
those limited circumstances for those folks. And then g~avely disabled is defined speci-
f for minors also. It's a different definition. And the definition, I think you'll 
probably have testimony today, some that believe that it probably should be revised or 
some that probably think it's adequate and what have you. An extremely important concept -
how you define grave disability for the purposes of all these detention provisions. 
Just briefly, the LPS Act, in addition to the periods of detention, also contains 
very specific enumerated patients' rights. There are provisions on confiden-
tiality of records and numerous other related provisions. For example, on the admini-
stration of ECT there's a very detailed statutory procedure establishing the procedures 
that must be gone through before ECT can be administered. 
Turning briefly to recent developments, I think as your staff has indicated to you, 
the Act really has not undergone a great deal of revision since its first enactment. 
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Probably the only two areas that really have been major endeavors have been the demon-
stratively dangerous period, the 180-day (inaudible) was substantially revised several 
years ago to change the period from 90 to 180 days, and to change from the term eminently 
dangerous to demonstratively dangerous and make certain other revisions. 
The other major area in which the LPS Act has been revised is the codification of 
the court's holding in Doe v. Gallinot, the federal court that said that those who are 
gravely disabled must have a state initiated review within seven days of initial deten-
tion and that's in addition to the provisions for habeas corpus during that 14-day period 
that can be filed with the superior court. 
Briefly, I do have the 1982-83 statistics. I'm told that the 1983-84 statistics 
will be out very soon, so just let me give you real quickly the number of detentions that 
occurred under each of these mechanisms. There were during the '82-83 Fiscal Year 
71,650 detentions for 72-hour evaluation and treatment. During the '82-83 Fiscal Year 
there were 30,467 certifications for 14-days intensive treatment. During the 1982-83 
Fiscal Year, and this is when it was a 90-day post-certification period for eminently 
dangerous, there were 196 detentions. And during that same period ...•• 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: 196 statewide? 
MR. ELDER: Yes. That's statewide. 196. Relatively small. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: Not 196 total. 
MR. ELDER: 196 total. And that is--I'll just briefly indicate one of the reasons 
that--that's correct. It was a very small amount because the standard of proof was very 
difficult when it was eminently dangerous. In fact, that prompted the revision of that 
several years ago by then Assemblyman Stirling, Dave Stirling, and changed the period 
to 180 days, changed it to demonstratively dangerous and we're not really sure until I 
get the new statistics what type of increase we're going to see in that. I'll just note 
parenthetically that the concept of demonstratively dangerous was judicially challenged 
and a California court of appeals upheld it as being constitutionally adequate. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: What's the difference in the definition of eminent and 
demonstrative? I don't know that. 
MR. ELDER: Well, without taking a long time, I think perhaps I could provide you, 
your staff or you, the court very carefully--you know, you do have certain constitutional 
requirements. The difference may be more apparent than real. So I'll leave it at that 
and provide your staff, and that's one thing I want to indicate, I'll provide you or your 
staff with any information I can on the case law and what I have on the particular issues 
here. 
On conservatorships, for temporary conservatorships during the 1982-83 Fiscal Year 
there were 8,750. And for permanent conservatorships during that period there were 11,790. 
And I think the last thing I would comment on when we talk about recent changes, 
and I note it's in your staff's work and I believe some of the folks testifying today will 
-10-
be alluding to it, one important case that is being dealt with by the Department of Mental 
Health now and perhaps it will have to be dealt with by the communities (inaudible) is 
the Jamison case which in essence involves the rights of patients to refuse medication 
under certain circumstances. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: Question. I've heard in the rumor mill that the Department 
is contemplating changing the LPS regulations. Can you shed any light about what's being 
considered? 
MR. ELDER: The Department currently has under review and consideration a revision 
of the patients' rights regulations. They're going through the administrative procedure 
process. If we're talking about the Jamison type of thing, the right to refuse, there's 
in Title IX the regulations relating to voluntary patients. There are no regu-
lations adopted relating to involuntary patients. The Department is at Napa State Hospi-
tal implementing a consent to create--the Department entered into with the plaintiffs 
and we anticipate that at the end of approximately a one-year period, which would be 
April, that the procedures will be applied to other state hospitals that have those same 
types of patients. So there is activity afoot on patients' rights regulations. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: And that's all that you're aware of? 
MR. ELDER: We also have ECT regulations that are being promulgated. They're 
going through the administrative procedure process. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: Lastly, for me, does the definition of grave disability 
change per level of hold - for 72-hour to 14-day to 
MR. ELDER: No, it remains the same. It's a constant. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: The same legal attest at that court hearing? 
MR. ELDER: That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN MCCORQUODALE: We've now been joined by Assemblyperson Mojonnier from 
San Diego County. Do you have any questions at this time? All right. We'll go to 
Ms. Lurie then. 
MS. BARBARA LURIE: Good morning, and thank you for inviting me. My job today is 
to you some of the philosophy and the perspective of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, 
otherwise known as LPS. 
The first thing you should know is that this law wasn't created because some 
bureaucrat had nothing to do on a boring Monday afternoon. It was a reaction against 
some very real abuses that went on in the past, and perhaps LPS is more understandable, 
even more palatable, if viewed in the context of what proceeded it. 
Before it was passed there were vague indefinite standards of who could be put in 
the hospital involuntarily and for how long. The old criteria stated that, "If a person 
were in such overall mental condition," - by the way, the term "mental condition" was 
never defined - "that they were in need of supervision, treatment, care or restraint, the 
person could be hospitalized until someone decided that they didn't need to be hospitalized 
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anymore." In other words, indefinitely. And that kind of elastic standard invited abuse 
and there was a lot of it. 
The California Assembly Subcommittee on Mental Health investigated the mental 
health system and produced a report that Senator Short just referred to just prior to 
the passage of LPS, and in their research they found that the average commitment hearing 
lasted an average of 4.7 minutes and fully a third of them lasted less than 2 minutes. 
So someone could be put away, and I'm not talking here just weeks and days as it is now, 
I'm talking sometimes these commitments were measured in terms of years and decades. 
Someone could be put away for a whole decade on the basis of a 4~ minute hearing. And 
less than 30 percent of these people even had legal counsel when they had their hearings. 
People kind of went into the system and just sort of disappeared. And patients in those 
days often left their rights at the doors of the psychiatric facilities. There were no 
phone calls, no visitors in many instances, and very little in the way of informed con-
sent. 
? 
Here in California we had Dr. Walter Freeman in the 1940s and '50s who was doing 
assemblyline lobotomies, sometimes 25 a day, by inserting a knitting needle in the eye 
orbit and poking around and severing connections in the brain tissue. 
At any rate, LPS came along as an attempt to balance the rights of the individual 
against the rights of society. It puts strict limits, as Carl Elder mentioned, about who 
can be put in the hospital now against their will and for how long. It was a revolu-
tionary law in its time but as the years went by it's become the model for virtually 
every state in the Union. 
If you look at the law in its full context, you'll see that it attempts a three-
way marriage between treatment needs on one hand, the need of the public for protection 
and individual civil liberty needs. Some people think that this is a marriage that's now 
ripe for divorce, or at least a trial separation. That's probably one of the reasons for 
the hearing today. 
The LPS Act tries to bow somewhat to each of these competing interests. The pro-
fessional person gets to treat patients even if they don't want to be treated. That's a 
lot more than doctors treating medical conditions can do. But the professionals don't get 
carte blanche. The patients may be kept against their will but they're guaranteed cer-
tain rights, such as a right to a hearing, as Carl Elder mentioned. 
So this medical legal partnership that LPS creates, that it forges these two 
arenas, is an uneasy one to be sure. It probably has something in it for everybody and it 
has something in it that's aggrevating everybody. Family members, for example, as you 
heard the gentleman speak earlier, are very frustrated in trying to get their loved ones 
into the system. Both family members and clinicians are frustrated in trying to keep the 
patients in this system, and clinicians are very frustrated in trying to give treatment 
while they're busy hopping around all the legalities that are strewn in their path. 
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therapists are torn between doing what seems to make sense in terms of treat-
ment and doing what the law requires. And society as a whole is frustrated at the barri-
cades it sees in trying to get the mentally disordered off the streets, because they, 
unfortunately and erroneously, equate mental disorder with dangerousness. As an aside, I 
should mention that the mentally disordered are far more likely to be victims of crime 
than perpetrators. Studies have repeatedly shown that the mentally disordered as a group 
are no more menacing than the population as a whole. And finally, the patients them-
selves are frustrated. Our office gets calls everyday from patients frustrated because 
want to get out and they can't. Or they want to get off their medication because 
don't like the side effects and the law doesn't allow them to. 
So, as you'll learn today, I'm sure that LPS has something--or it seems like at 
times it pleases none of the people all of the time, or all of the people none of the 
time. The frustration that it engenders may be an indication of its failure, but para-
doxically it may be an indication of its success because the frustration seems to come 
equally from every corridor. And with any good compromise, none of the parties walks 
away perfectly happy. Everybody's displeased or disgruntled about what they've given 
up. 
LPS can be seen as a funnel with a series of filters. It's fairly open at the 
and then it starts to get narrower as you progress. So the longer someone is held 
involuntarily, the more difficult it gets to keep them. There's more stringent stand-
ards, more due process procedures. And it's intended that way. It's deliberate to filter 
out all but the most necessary, most severe cases. And it's also designed to screen out 
all patients who can possibly accept treatment voluntarily. According to its legislative 
intent, LPS favors voluntary treatment over involuntary. So obviously do patients and 
so does the therapeutic community. Voluntary treatment certainly is easier and more 
That's one point I think that all sides can agree on. No one really likes 
an involuntary system. 
clinicians complain about all the legal rigamarole that LPS dumps on their 
and I'm sure you'll hear about that more today. Involuntary patients have a probable 
cause hearing and they're entitled to a second writ of habeas corpus hearing if they 
choose. Clinicians complain that they spend time that they could be treating patients 
in the courtroom, and I am sympathetic. to that. But compare our mental health system 
to the criminal justice system. To hold a person in that system just for a few days there 
must be an arrest, a booking, an arraignment hearing with witnesses, subpoenas, pre-trial 
motions, and that's all before the trial even begins. And in that system, the person is 
usually free out on bail during all this legal maneuvering - patients are not. Further, 
the people who enjoy all these legal safeguards in the criminal justice system usually 
have committed a crime. Psychiatric patients haven't. 
LPS in building legal safeguards for its patient is simply acknowledging that 
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whenever there's a concentration of power in any group of people or any person, be it the 
President of the United States, psychiatrists or whomever, there needs to be a checks and 
balance system to make sure that that power is not used excessively or inappropriately. 
And the ability to deprive someone of their right to freedom and liberty just on the basis 
of your signature as the law allows mental health professions to do now, is about as 
powerful as you can get. 
LPS also acknowledges the need for treatment. One of its , as Carl Elder 
mentioned, as stated in the legislative intent, is to "provide for prompt evaluation and 
treatment for persons with serious mental disorders." The law says that involuntary 
patients must be given treatment for the full period of time they're held. In other words, 
the law is saying if you're going to take away somebody's freedom, something that im-
portant, you darn well better give them something very important in return. Ironically, 
in pre-LPS days patients were put away because they were in need of treatment but then 
often didn't get any or got very little. 
But in recognizing the need for treatment, LPS also recognizes that psychiatry is 
an inexact science andwell-meaningprofessionals are apt to make mistakes. One of LPS's 
stated goals, as Carl Elder mentioned, was to end inappropriate commitment. That's why 
the criteria of LPS focuses on observable behavior rather than psychodynamics. In 
specifying that a person has to be a danger to themselves, a danger to others, or gravely 
disabled, the Legislature was saying they really don't care about the person's dilusions, 
their hallucinations, even their thought process. What they care about is the person's 
actions and specifically the dangerous repercussions of those actions. Is this person 
likely to harm themselves, harm somebody else or are they just not going to make it with-
out some kind of government intervention. Those three criteria were the only ones that 
were thought of as being so crucial that they superseded that individual's right to 
liberty. 
Getting back to the possibility of mistakes, there's always a tendency for thera-
pists to err on the side of caution and hospitalize a patient when there is any doubt. 
If a dangerous patient is erroneously released to the streets there may be screaming 
headlines the next day, there may be lawsuits, there may be a lot of repercussions, but 
there usually are no such repercussions if a non-dangerous patient is erroneously put in 
the hospital, except of course for the patient himself. 
Another stated goal of LPS is to end indefinite involuntary commitment. Not only 
did long commitments unnecessarily deprive people of their freedom, but they created the 
institutionalized patient who spent his days and nights vegetating in the back wards of 
psychiatric hospitals. Getting well requires the opportunity to adopt to a reality out-
side the confines of the hospital and these people never got that opportunity so they 
never did get well. It was kind of a self-perpetuating situation, an iatrogenic dis-
order as Senator Short referred to. 
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course, LPS was predicated on the assumption that once the patient .was 
ital there would be a whole safety net of community services and resources 
to meet him. These services by and large have never materialized and patients 
from the back wards of hospitals to the back streets with very little or 
Some of the failures that are laid at the door of the LPS Act are really 
to the fact that the money never did follow the patients in the community 
and 
In sum, if any one is to wed the conflicting medical objectives of treat 
without legal delays, and the equally valid legal aim of ensuring that persons 
of their liberties without due process, there's going to be some tension, 
internal and external- that's inevitable- and perhaps that's not unhealthy. Many 
who have watched the perverbial pendulum swing in the direction of patients' rights 
and due process are eager now for gravity to take its course. They want to see some 
in the other direction. But on the other hand there are many people out there 
who think that LPS hasn't gone far enough in protecting the rights of patients. What 
makes it especially difficult for you as legislators is that one system, be it LPS or 
new that you create, is going to have to accommodate all of the different some-
interests, and it's not an issue of right and wrong really, but of dif-
ferent of what is right. Every group, the parents, the patients, the advocates, 
the , every group wants to see what's right and best for the patients, and 
tried to strike an artful balance among all these groups where perhaps none is 
Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN MCCORQUODALE: Thank you. You commented an interesting comparison be-
doctors can do and psychiatrists but it seems to me that if it were that easy 
we might not have to have a hearing. Often when the--what the doctor wants to do, 
wants to do to a patient, the patient still has the ability to make rational -
least what we would term rational - decisions related to their care. And if they have 
in their hand they can decide whether they want to be treated for it and 
want to be treated. But we don't have the ability to let the body make the 
after 
for the brain in a reverse situation. And for the person whose son comes home 
gone for three or four years and will only eat out of the garbage can in the 
and sleeps in the rain and runs the risk of catching pneumonia or some illness 
and has no way to handle that situation, no way to take care of--make a change in the 
behavior, it's harder to discuss with them then the rational reason behind the 
Lanterman-Petris-Short Act of the right of people to not be incarcerated or 
their will. It's not quite as easy as comparing the doctor and the 
MS. LURIE: That's correct, you're correct, but two points. One is that consents 
are an all or nothing thing. Somebody can be mentally disordered but they 
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still may have the capacity to decide whether or not they want a particular medication, 
whether it makes them drowsy, whether it's unpleasant for them, what the repercussions of 
the medication are. They may have hallucinations and delusions in other areas but maybe 
they can make that one kind of informed choice. That's number one. And number two is 
that LPS does build in mechanisms to handle cases that you're about. If patients 
can't provide for their own food, clothing and shelter can be hospitalized even if 
they don't want to be in the hospital. 
CHAIRMAN MCCORQUODALE: Well, not very easy under the current court rulings, 
though. 
MS. LURIE: Not very easily but it's done all the time. It was done to 11,790 
people, according to Carl Elder, put on conservatorship last year. 
CHAIRMAN MCCORQUODALE: Okay, any other questions? 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: I have one. I think you did a good job trying to demon-
strate the various sides of the issue and also presenting the need to have some sort of 
structure and mechanism to protect the rights and you did a good job of that. I would 
say, though, that the reason we're having the hearing and the reason it's an issue now 
is it's from a different set of circumstances that caused the LPS Act to be passed in the 
first place. There was a whole background that you articulated well that caused, thank 
goodness, the LPS Act to come into being. But now there's a different set of concerns 
and emotions out there that are causing a reevaluation and that is--the simple way of 
explaining it is that there's a gigantic overwhelming under-attention to people who are 
sick, and the legal aspect of keeping people who are sick from treated is just one 
of the ways, the lack of money, the lack of community programs, the lack of state. The 
whole system is meeting a tiny fraction of people who really need help. Only a small 
fraction are getting help. So that is the arena, or the aura with which we're approaching 
this. And what we have heard in the Select Committee over and over and over are 
the problems of people who desperately need help, who can't because of the LPS Act. And 
where we hear that most is with children. Not that they are numerically more but that 
the problems of the LPS Act, it's vagueness and lack of specificity for the differences 
between children and adults, keeps kids from getting help. It's easier to put a child 
into the criminal system and into jail than it is to have them treatment because of 
LPS, so tell us parent after parent after parent after parent. Now, clearly this balance 
that you refer to is something that has to be struck and the patient rights is one of 
the things that distinguishes us from less civilized societies and we have to keep that. 
But I guess this long preface is a question to you. In light of the fact that you are 
charged- and I respect your charge with the responsibility of heading up the patients' 
rights side of the system - but within that position do you see any problems? I mean, 
from your point of view do you see problems where the LPS Act goes too far? Do you see 
any problems particularly in the area of children? 
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I don't know exactly what the status of the child is right now, but they were absolutely 
certain that if they lost, the child would die, would destroy herself. And what they pre-
sented to us, and I'm just repeating to you what things we've heard, is that it was 
extremely difficult for them in cases like this to gain conservatorship. 
MS. LURIE: Well, conservatorship is, as Carl Elder mentioned, just for people who 
are gravely disabled, unable to provide for food, clothing and shelter. That definition 
has been changed for children a couple of years ago because kids by definition are unable 
to provide for their own food, clothing, or shelter so how can you tell if one can't be-
cause of a mental disorder? So the law was rewritten to say that a gravely disabled 
child is one who can't avail himself of the food or clothing or shelter that's been pro-
vided for him or her. 
Now, the judge in our county doesn't impose a middle-class guideline of providing 
food, clothing and shelter well, dressing well, eating a balanced meal, you know, living 
in a nice warm place. He's imposing minimal standards - can this person provide food or 
clothing or shelter on a minimal level, and if they can he will find that there is no 
grave disability. So if you think that's difficult that is the standard that he imposes. 
Some people are out there and they certainly live lives that you wouldn't want to live, 
that I wouldn't want to live. Their quality of life is very poor but they are to some 
minimal level providing for themselves - they do not want hospitalization - so the judge 
in our county allows them to continue what they're doing. 
But getting back to kids, in our county right now kids can be hospitalized on 
parental signature in most private and county facilities because, again, of all of this 
unclearness around the Roger S. decision. Facilities have deeded to just go ahead and 
do it until such time as they're told they can't. So that doesn't seem to be much prob-
lem. What is a problem is getting kids into state facilities because the states definitely 
are covered under Roger S. 
CHAIRMAN MCCORQUODALE: All right, fine. Thank you. We appreciate your coming 
today. All right, we'll take a break now so the transcriptionist can take a break. Relax 
her fingers. 
- BREAK -
CHAI~~ MCCORQUODALE: All right, we'll resume the hearing. Mr. Bronzan, you had 
a comment you wanted to make? 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: Yes. During the break my staff gave me a report on the 
little girl that I mentioned that we discussed just at the end of the last witness and I 
thought I would give you the report as to what happened to her, or at least so far. First 
of all, it was determined, which is apparently part of the law and the practice, that the 
fact that she was extremely or severely homicidal and suicidal was not germane to the 
issue of whether she can be put on conservatorship. So the fact that she was very, very 
ill and dangerous to herself and others was not considered relative to whether she could 
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CHAIRMAN All thank you. Our next is Marjorie 
Schwartz, American Civil Liberties Union. don't we have the whole come up. 
Is Colette Hughes here and Jean Matulis? Colette Hughes is with Title IX Patients' 
Advocates, and Jean is with California of Mental Health Clients. 
MS. MARJORIE SCHWARTZ: I'm Schwartz the American Civil 
Liberties Union. I'd like to start you a little bit about my background in 
this area. In law school I was a research assistant in a county public defender's 
office as a full-time job I about LPS clients 
that of time. After that I went to work at the Sta.te Public Defender's 
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it is extremely important that people be given as much freedom to make decisions about 
the control of their life as possible and that we not make decisions about confinement 
based on differences and judgments on lifestyle. 
I will just go through some of these questions that have been sent to us and tell 
you what our response is briefly to some of them. As far as the 51/50 which is the pro-
cedure by which people are taken either from courts or by law enforcement to a mental 
health facility, my experience in Sacramento was confirmed by my discussion with the 
head of the Los Angeles Public Defender Mental Health Division, Ed Gilmore, who I spoke 
to last week. Both of us feel that there's no problem with the criteria. The problem is 
that there's a limit on facilities and resources. The people who are taken to the secure 
mental health facilities, who require extra amount of supervision, are rejected. They 
clearly meet the standard but there is a problem in security. Apparently it's been solved 
in Los Angeles by a psychiatric wing of 35 beds in the jail. However, that is, as far as 
I know, the only county that has that type of facility. And even from what I understand, 
that is not sufficiently large. I know that when the sheriff here, or the courts were 
sending them to the UC Medical Center, psychiatric wing, the most common complaint was, 
and there was actually blackmail, that we're going to send these people back until you 
provide us more sheriffs to guard them. And it was clear that the people met the stan-
dard. The only people that were retained were the most passive, people that could be put 
on drugs and needed very little supervision. And I lobbied for this when we were doing 
funding for the jails; unfortunately, I did not get any support. But I wanted that mil-
lions, hundreds of millions being given to the counties to be spent on jail construction 
to somehow be tied to additional facilities for the mentally ill. There are too many 
mentally ill in the jails, and the beds in the psychiatric facilities are not being 
properly used with people that don't belong in the criminal justice system. So I think 
again it's a question of dollars. It has nothing to do with changing the statute or the 
criteria but somehow the counties have to provide facilities where there's proper secur-
ity for people who are mentally ill to such a degree that they are either active and 
wander away or try to injure other people. 
On the second question, the temporary or permanent conservatorship, this a little 
bit relates to what Mr. Bronzan was saying about the 5-year-old girl, and there is some 
clarification that's necessary on that. The 72-hours is the same regardless of the 
standard - danger to other, danger to self or gravely disabled. Then you go into a 
14-day hold. That's the same for either situation. Gravely disabled is the only one 
that goes into conservatorship. But danger to other and danger to self do have long-term 
holds. I don't remember the term on danger to self. I think it's still 90 days. 
Recently, Senator Keene carried a piece of legislation, SB 236, that expanded the 
danger to others. And those are prosecuted by the district attorney. They're handled 
differently. But you can get a long-term hold on someone who's either danger to self or 
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to others. It's just not called a and it is less than a year. But 
the are the same. And often the complaints about not being able to 
hold these people, when you further you find that they never even tried these 
alternative methods of 
ASS~1BLYMAN BRONZAN: Is that method for children? 
MS. SCHWARTZ: I don't see not. There s no reason why not. And I think that 
the rationale - again I want to confine this to adults - I think maybe in the case of a 
child that's suicidal you may be able to make an that it's different than an 
adult. But in the case of adults, are suicidal for years and it's often 
a way to get attention. And you can now under law hold them for 31 days and plug 
them into a prevention program. If a person who's suicidal will be benefited by 
that type of a program, you'll know within 31 And after that point they can become 
or you can extend the--if there's additional suicidal threats, you can keep 
the commitments. But the problem with suicidal is that it goes in and out, 
it isn't permanent like grave can be, and can function for many years 
and maybe become depressed for a week or a month and then threaten to commit suicide. 
And so I think that there's a justification for not the conservatorship where they 
lose control of their life, their finances, where they live~ Because the 
mental illness of suicide or the result of suicide is different and that is that day to 
they can take care of their lives but a crisis happens and the person can't 
deal with it and it just doesn't j loss of control. 
The with danger to other is a little different and that is that the 
literature is with studies and I think and psychologists will be 
the irst to admit that can't to others. There's a relatively famous 
that was done in New York after a court decision released a number of people because 
the court felt that were held - weren't , mentally ill and 
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after there were--there were hundreds released and they 
compared the results of the release with their and predictions and the psychia-
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And so, what you're doing, what the value decision we've made is that it's better 
to err on the side of the freedom in these cases, because there's just no way to know 
who is Other studies show that the 
who are not as 
ill are not dangerous at a higher 
ill. And so, for that reason 
we've kept the danger to others standard quite narrow and we've limited the terms of 
commitment, , less than a year, but it was just increased to six months. 
The other change that was made in the Keene is that it allows the 
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commitment to be made on the basis of a threat that was made prior to being locked up. 
Under previous law it had to be either an overt act or a threat while in a confined 
situation. It was felt that a threat made under those circumstances should be taken more 
seriously than threats like I'm going to kill that person -which people say in their 
ordinary course of living I'm going to get that person or I'd like to wring his neck. 
Those kinds of statements are made and you have to be careful that those aren't used as 
the basis for loss of liberty. And we adamantly opposed that change and it only went 
into effect - I'm not sure whether it was this past January or the January before - but 
I would strongly advise that you take a look at the impact of that change and the increase 
in the length of commitment before making any further changes in this area. I think it 
would be interesting to see whether there's been an increase in commitment, whether one's 
that go to trial aren't successful and generally what has been the result of those 
changes before any further changes in that area. 
I have to apologize on the incompetency issue - the medical procedures. I had 
hoped to speak to the lawyer, our lead lawyer, on Jamison- I think he's been on vaca-
tion and I haven't been able to reach him and I would not want to even address these 
without discussing with him. I would prefer sending these questions to him and having 
him submit some written testimony on Jamison. I had hoped to get him here. So I'm 
going to pass over (B) rather than talk about something I really don't know what I'm 
talking about. 
In moving to (C), (C) talks about the option for recertification for a second 
14-days now for suicidal and I think I've pretty much answered this actually about - oh 
no, I'm sorry, this is whether we should have second 40-days as a substitute for temporary. 
? 
The general consensus of people I've talked to in the field, again, is that the T-con, 
there is some abuse already in the temporary conservatorship. It's often used to buy 
time. What happens is the guardian and the other people involved just haven't really had 
time to evaluate the patient and decide whether a conservatorship is appropriate or not. 
And that's a problem, but on the other hand we'd rather see a 30-day temporary conservator-
ship than an inappropriate conservatorship. You must keep in mind that there are various 
due process hearings that you have a right to during these, and that if you add a 14-day 
then the patient will have an additional hearing, a right to a new hearing, which I know 
the practitioners will oppose. And although we feel there's some abuse in temporary 
conservatorships that a great many of those that are filed do not result in permanent 
conservatorships, I think we prefer sticking with that rather than having either 14 days 
which might be too short or eliminating the temporary and going straight to conservator-
ship, because we think that the abuse will just move to permanent conservatorship which 
is a much more costly procedure and takes longer to sort out. 
So I think if I can make that--I'm not sure I'm making this clear but the temporary 
is used to buy time for additional investigation, and although we think that's a little 
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abusive, we'd rather see that continue because the result is that there's 
an appropriate and informed decision made about the person and we'd rather see that con-
tinue than new holds put in there that would just further the abuse or may not 
the authorities time. 
And that leads to the second and that is the caseloads on the 
conservators are just ridiculous. I think there were four conservators in Sacramento 
for , 300 active cases. The conservator sees the person about once a year 
unless it's a problem case and there's some reason to bring it to their attention. The 
doctors, from our experience, there are some doctors that are doing it - I'm reluctant 
to criticize the medical , I don't think this happens in every case -but there 
are some Medi-Cal mills on mental health doctors who ten-minute visits their 
caseload is entirely made up of SSI/SSP patients. I don't think that's always the case. 
Unfortunately, the better doctors are not willing to take Medi-Cal because of the low 
reimbursement rate or other problems, and I think that from my experience the doctors 
that were helping people were in the minority. And also the caseload was just 
absurd. We found placement was made based on where there was an available bed, not what 
was the most appropriate placement for the person. It never fit the person, it was just 
where there was a bed open, and I think that that's one of the biggest problems. 
This ties to another problem that I think runs throughout the system. As far as 
the statute, we don't feel there are any major changes that should be made in the 
the 
or the standard. I will be the first to admit that there is a great deal of 
and probably a great deal of variance from county to county in the way it's 
applied. The problem with trying to narrow that further is that you'll never have 
interests all agree, and I think to some degree the ambiguity has worked to 
the benefit of everyone. Counties have been able to work out a system that fits the 
• fits the parties involved and fits the resources of the county. But I do think 
that there is a problem in terms of delivery of services and I don't know how else to 
solve it other than dollars. 
The only other way I would suggest a is that there should be some sort of 
more of on a conservatorship. And I think this might force 
the conservators to take a more individual look at each case. now they pay all 
the bills and they decide where the patient lives, and the patient is categorically denied 
any s. There are some people that are in a more transition type of situation, and 
I think Barbara Lurie talked about this. This was the of this spectrum that was 
never delivered. And part of it is finances but I think part of it is inherent in the 
because once a person is put on a conservatorship they have no decision-making 
rights over their life at all. I represented a woman who had been on a conservatorship 
as a result of a after the loss of a , and I hadn't seen her 
at the early stages and I have no doubt that she was gravely disabled. But by the time 
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she was up for renewal and I sawyer, she was living in one of the most more open of 
the community board and care facilities and really was, I would say, well or almost well. 
She had on her own gone out and got a waitressing job and was making some money and 
banking it, which she obviously would need to get back into society, because the $300 
or whatever it is you get a month is gone at the end of the month. When her conservator 
found out about that it jeopardized her - she was no disabled 
and she had to give up the job and she had to return all the money. So what would happen 
is once they decide she's well, she's out on the street, no job, no money saved and that's 
it. I saw that happen time and time again. I represented another patient who was in a 
VA hospital in Palo Alto, even though he was a Sacramento resident. He contested the 
renewal of the conservatorship. He won - the jury came back at 5:00 on a Friday that he 
was no longer gravely disabled. The conservatorship put him out on the street - they 
would not even send him back to the VA hospital until Monday morning to pick up what was 
left of his money and belongings - they would not cut a check until Monday morning when 
the office reopened. The judge loaned him the money to make it through the weekend, and 
I think that's why when you hear about the revolving door in the mental health system 
that's why. 
I think that pretty much sums up what I wanted to say. 
SENATOR MCCORQUODALE: All right, thank you. Any questions? All right. Colette 
Hughes? 
MS. COLETTE HUGHES: I am proud to be representing Title IX Advocates and par-
ticularly look forward to participation in the task force. We're all participants who 
will share their own expertise and learn from the expertise of others in order to assist 
the Legislature to create the most dignified effective mental health system possible. 
Since I represent the consensus perspective of Title IX Advocates, it is proper 
that all here comprehend the broad, diverse statewide constituency that is the Title IX 
Advocacy network by learning we are social workers, nurses, psychologists, paralegals, 
mental health administrators, ex-consumers, family members of consumers, attorneys, non-
profit corporate community organizers, and some of us are even Republicans. By vocation 
we are patients' rights advocates. But the one characteristic we all possess is a shared 
value regarding our mission. Title IX Advocates seek to pursue the expressed desires 
of our clients within the confines of the law and to affirm the dignity of all individuals 
considered mentally disordered. 
None of the important questions before us today can be probed in meaningful detail. 
That is the joint work of the committees, the task force, the Legislature and the citizenry 
at large. But I will briefly attempt to address a few of the great dignity and fairness 
questions posed in Section A, entitled "Involuntary Commitment Criteria, 11 and in Section 
B, entitled "Concept of Competence Issues." 
Title IX Advocates do not believe that Section 5150 sets forth meaningful, 
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criteria for involuntarily detaining a citizen. We contend that the pre-
1975 standard of reasonable cause based on belief related to personal observation is 
to the present probable cause and probable-cause-to-believe standard. Why? 
for four reasons: Because no one, including hearing officers, knows what 
cause means within the LPS framework. More importantly, any cause standard to 
detain should demand some basis in fact. The present evidentiary criteria 
reliance on infinite layers of , absent any demonstrable fact. The 
standard requires the designated individual initiating the 5150 process to often sub-
s or totally rely on judg,ment exclusive from his or her own. This concern has 
been expressed to me several times by police officers in my own county. 
The unfair and administratively cumbersome result is that the present standard 
often makes it impossible to determine the relevant facts and circumstances actually 
the 5150. This is the same information that is often used to justify the 
of further involuntary detention pursuant to 5250. And therefore within 5250 
hearings it is often very difficult, to impossible, for the hearing officers to determine 
whether or not there is any longer cause to hold, because it is nearly impossible to sift 
what has been stated in the chart or elsewhere and to discover what facts, if any 
are there. 
Title IX Advocates do believe that there is sound reasoning for continuing the 
differentiation between gravely disabled and danger to self. Why? Because the differen-
tiation between the two categories or the substantiation of their co-existence focuses 
more specifically on the nature of both the legal and care or treatment issue involved 
than would the blending of the criteria. The statutory definition of grave disability 
should be modified to include the case law concept that a person is not gravely disabled 
if the person can elicit the assistance of willing and responsible others to help take 
care of his or her basic personal needs. Additionally, the need for shelter repeatedly 
arises as a discreet problem for individuals detained as gravely disabled. This is par-
t true for those individuals considered chronic and not amenable to traditional 
treatment. These individuals are usually diagnosed as having some form of 
Since the present model of treatment used almost universally throughout the system 
not alter the chronic or psychlic nature of these individuals' problems of daily 
, the focus should be on providing shelter - a safe homelike environment - rather 
than repeatedly thrusting unsuccessful treatment on individuals which only serves to 
frustrate treatment staff, and more importantly, unnecessarily assaults the dignity and 
often the physical and emotional health of these individuals categorized as chronic and 
not amenable to treatment. 
Our obligation to ensure that these individuals' nutritional, shelter and 
needs are met should not be equated with locked, in-patient custodial care as the sole 
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option, as it is no meaningful dignified option for these individuals at all. Nor is 
this option economically sound. Supervision, care, safety, nutritional needs and shelter 
can, for example, be fulfilled by living in a group home. Additionally, involuntarily 
hospitalized individuals often are not unable to provide for basic needs. Rather, fre-
quently community-based support systems and programs either cannot, because there are not 
enough of them, or refuse to assist individuals in carrying out their daily living plans. 
Individuals have ended up LPS conserved as gravely disabled because some areas geo-
graphically in the State of California do not have enough P.O. boxes. Therefore, the 
individual cannot receive his or her disability check and is thereby rendered penniless. 
Or the individual cannot access entitlements because he or she has no legal address. The 
absurdity of such a tragedy is painfully obvious. 
Looking at why danger to self should remain a separate category, some experts 
argue that in order to be held as a danger to self, intentional motive for self-destruc-
tion or an overt suicidal act must be shown. This argument is not substantiated by the 
experience of advocates and attorneys representing clients in probable cause hearings. 
The power of society to compel psychiatric treatment, including involuntary hospitaliza-
tion, which is part and parcel of the LPS conservatorship rights disablement of the 
individual, would most likely be harmful to intentionally or unintentionally self-
destructive and/or suicidal persons. There is no present evidence that society reduces 
suicide through involuntary hospitalization or forced treatment. In fact, of the few 
studies that have been done, the opposite has shown to be true. Further, it is hard to 
comprehend how depriving individuals, who already have low self-esteem, are feeling self-
destructive or are suicidal, could receive a healing effect by virtue of rights disable-
ment via the LPS conservatorship system. 
I would now like to talk briefly about the issue of competence. The issue of 
competence is the greatest challenge we must now face if the system is to survive as a 
healing force, Historically, and under California law, competence or incompetence, capa-
bility or lack of capability to make a decision implicating fundamental human rights is 
properly determined in relation to the particular rights society seeks to disable an 
individual of. Incapacity is particular, not global. For example, a person may be 
capable of deciding whether or not to receive certain psychiatric trea.tment because he 
or she understands the risks and benefits inherent in such treatment, but incapable of 
entering into a business contract. Forcing treatment upon an individual absent of finding 
of incapacity to make a treatment decision is, in the opinion of most Title IX Advocates, 
tortious, unconstitutional, highly offensive to the personal autonomy of the individual, 
and counter therapeutic. The practice tears at the heart of the fundamental precepts 
underlying the medico-psychiatric healing relationship. Further, Advocates contend that 
those whose obligation it is to offer treatment should not determine whether or not a 
person is capable of making a particular treatment decision. 
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Psychiatric literature reflects the fact that the psychiatric profession is in 
accord that such a decision is a legal determination and not properly within the subject 
matter of medical judgment. However, unlike the Mills case model, Advocates do not en-
dorse the proposition that probate judges are necessarily best suited to assess capacity 
or incapacity. Title IX Advocates do endorse the proposition of substitute decision-
once a determination of incapacity to make a treatment decision is reached. The 
substitute decision-maker should be a type of surrogate whose sole vested interest is to 
carry out the expressed wishes of the individual insofar as they can be ascertained if 
the person were presently capable to make the decision. The Advocates' position in this 
regard is that neither a conservator or a probate judge could properly function as a 
substitute decision-maker given the present manner in which the conservatorship system 
functions and is presently burdened. 
Finally, as a matter of personal conunentary, and this is a schtick that Assemblyman 
Bronzan has partially heard before, as has Miss North, but just as a stream can never 
rise higher than its source, nor can an advocate ever rise above the client, for the 
client defines our very existence. Likewise, no public official can rise higher than the 
citizenry, including those labeled "mentally disordered." The legal concept is called 
11equal protection of the laws" to which we are all entitled. Therefore, we must beware 
of the treachery inherent in judging those who appear or think differently from ourselves. 
judgments which obviously affect the quality of life of those individuals society con-
siders mentally disordered. 
In conclusion, I offer the following brief quote from Sir Thomas More, which talks 
about the concept of equal protection in relation to the rule of law. "The law ••• the 
law, I know what's legal, not what's right and I'll stick by what's legal. I'm not God. 
The currents and eddys of right and wrong which you find plain sailing I can't navigate. 
Yes I'd the devil the benefit of law for my own safety's sake." 
Thank you. 
SENATOR MCCORQUODALE: Thank you. I appreciate your quotes and especially about 
the citizens, although there are those who would look at the Legislature and say that 
the mentally disabled have more than their fair share of representation. 
All right, our next speaker is Jean Matulis from the California Network of 
Mental Health Clients. 
MS. JEAN MATULIS: Thank you. I'm very proud to represent the California Network 
of Mental Health Clients, and I am also a member. 
I wanted to start out by commenting that it really says a lot about our mental 
health system if a person would rather eat out of a garbage can and stay in the rain 
than be a part of it. I think we have to look at what that says about our system. 
The California Network of Mental Health Clients is a statewide self-help organi-
zation that's been in existence for--it's in its second year now and it's growing and it s 
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a real exciting movement and an exciting organization and it's comprised entirely of 
people who have been in the mental health system and we'd like to do something about 
taking control of our own lives. 
One of the problems is the issue of forced treatment that we're here discussing 
today. Ultimately, the Network is against forced treatment, and in the meantime, seeks 
to promote all rights protecting patients who are in this situation. There are many 
problems with this. Forced treatment in itself is not therapeutic. In order to 
have something that's going to be helpful to a person, I think most professional circles 
would agree requires a couple of key elements. One of them is trust and one of them is 
motivation. And in this context of forced treatment, these two things don't even have a 
chance to begin to develop. Many people would like, or would want some kind of help and 
are terrified of the mental health system because of what they themselves have experienced, 
what they have observed in their friends' livesand in people's lives around them. They 
go with their needs unmet. They're living in pain and they don't have anywhere to go. 
Recently - well, not so recently - when the state hospitals started to move into 
the communities putting people out, it wasn't really out of care of the patients alone 
or necessarily, but it was really a primary--an economic motivation. But the funding 
never really did follow the patients as other people have pointed out today. It never 
really followed people into the communities. The programs that are the most vital to 
the patients, the most vital to their survival, are the ones that are constantly in threat 
of being defunded. They have to scrap. They live in constant fear of becoming defunded, 
the ones that are providing the most direct services. We're talking about homelessness 
as a criteria for an involuntary hold. Obviously, a person is actually within the 
definition - homelessness becomes part of the definition of mental disorder - and in a 
time like this when homelessness is obviously such a severe problem, to make that part 
of a definition, we really have to be very careful and look in the direction society is 
moving. 
I know that--I've seen people like in the hospital that were--wanted to be there 
for--like they liked their counselor, they wanted to have the kind of services, discharge 
planning, that they needed and that they knew that they needed, but wanted to be voluntary 
patients. They were not allowed to be voluntary patients. They were made involuntary 
patients so that they couldn't refuse medications, and the rationale given by the doctor 
was that if they don't take medications, the utilization review team will come and push 
them out because they're not receiving medical services and we have no business keeping 
them here. Well, some of the hospitals take $550 a day as a base rate for treating people 
and there is just no justification when this money could be going directly toward survival 
services. Why are people being medicalized? Why are their basic human problems being 
forced into a medical model just so it can be treated medically so that we can get the 
funding when it would be much more economically sound to fund direct survival service 
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? And this is something that we need and there's a growing number of consumer 
organizations which are now trying to get funding for their own programs because we feel 
that we know basically what we need, and we would like to see an end to the forced 
medicalization of who are just trying to survive in this society. 
Another issue that comes up is the standard for danger to others. Unfortunately, 
it is extremely vague. It's really sometimes at the discretion of people like a social 
worker, a nurse, that might feel that the person is dangerous. I've discussed this with 
some of these people before. I know of one woman who was brought in - she was calm when 
they went over - they had reason to look into the situation - the mother had wanted her 
to come in - the mother believed that they were going to come in as an intervention in 
a counseling team but they brought the police with them - and when the woman saw the 
police she became very frightened and started screaming and she was screaming and she 
was saying, "Please talk to me. please talk to me, I want to talk," because she felt she 
was going to be hauled off. Well, they didn't talk to her and the reason for not talking 
to her was because she was too upset to talk. By the time she got to the hospital she 
was so hysterical that she was thrown into a seclusion room and put into restraints. I 
am also an Advocate in the County of San Francisco and I had permission to read the 
records and when--the rationale was she wasn't hitting anybody at the time the determina-
tion was made - all she was screaming was, "I want to talk." And again, they found, oh, 
she was too upset to talk, so they put her in seclusion - and in the process of putting 
her in seclusion she was resisting this act and she struck out at someone. Well then, 
that was written down that she became combative while being assisted into the seclusion 
room. I always find it difficult to accept the double standard of the way these things 
are recorded that then become actually a legal document in the patient's record- they 
became combative while being assisted or while being escorted - and I never see the blow 
by blow description being given from a fair neutral party - it's very prejudiced - and 
then this is considered to be some sort of a medical document that has some sort of 
control over it and it's really shocking. 
I have then seen patients being transferred to another hospital - after having an 
experience like that - one woman who was crying and put into seclusion and it said, again, 
became combative while being escorted. When she was transferred to another hospital the 
first words on her face sheet was this patient is combative. So originally she was crying 
and she was put in seclusion, but then because the seclusion experience was so provoca-
tive that then she was fighting back and this became the basis to hold her. Now she's 
branded as a combative person. So now when we get to the issue of observable - when we 
talk about 180-day post-certification, we're talking about observable violence - the 
violence that's being perpetuated upon the people is not being recorded in the way it's 
the context is being changed so that it looks like this person is now 
observably violent whereas originally they were crying or upset. And I really find this 
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very difficult to handle. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: Let me ask a question. On that particular case, was the 
violent -of course, it's impossible on a hearing like this to know what went on and what 
the truth was - but just as an example, to your knowledge, was the violence that the -
was it a woman that you described? 
MS. MATULIS: There was two women that I described. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: Okay. Was that used subsequently in a hearing as you sort 
of alluded to? In that particular case, was that parituclar act of violence in resisting 
the escort, or whatever, used against them as part of the means to hold them for a longer 
period of time? 
MS. MATULIS: Actually, in this case I don't know. However, what I'm saying 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: You're saying it as a general comment. 
MS. MATULIS: In general, when you see--when I saw the face sheet on the next--see, 
she went from one hospital to another and I went to the next hospital because she had 
asked me to come in, and what I saw, it said the first thing on the face sheet was this 
patient is combative, this person is a danger to others and combative, but it didn't give 
the context. This person was combative while being hauled off, and I'm just saying that 
that wasn't spelled out, so it could have potentially been considered observable behavior 
that could be used against her. 
ASSEMBLY~~ BRONZAN: Is it in fact used as observable behavior for violent 
activity that could then hold the person for a longer period of time? Just from time to 
time in general does that happen? 
MS. HUGHES: I can answer that. In San Francisco the Advocates do not represent 
patients in probable cause hearings and a lot of other counties they do and in my county 
we do. Resistence to seclusion, trying to get out of seclusion, is often used as evi-
dence that the person is a danger to others. In fact, statements that are used as evi-
dence in the hearing review record are statements like patient appeared angry in the 
hearing, patient has been combative and has resisted seclusion. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: Okay, then the follow-up question I have on that is that 
that statement that you would quote appears in the proceeding and that statement comes 
from the professional, theoretically, who was handling this person? And who wrote the 
statement in the first place that the person appeared angry or was hostile or resisted. 
MS. SCHWARTZ: If I could interject here. Usually it's the nurses--or the psych-
tech on the floor who makes observations on a daily basis. I've seen the same thing. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: So it's the professional in a facility ..••• 
MS. SCHWARTZ: Yes, and sometimes it's not really the doctor. In some cases it 
could be the doctor but often it's the day-to-day caretaker. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: Okay. And then at that point - this goes back to a question 
I asked earlier and I'll ask it again with one of our other witnesses - there is generally 
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other testimony to the contrary is there? 
MS. SCHWARTZ: Right, when there's no one else there. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: Either for that particular incident or just in general 
about the person, there's no other opposing testimony about the individuals. 
MS. SCHWARTZ: Yes. You don't really have time to--usually the family is also 
agreeing with the lock-up decision and so there's really nowhere else to go. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: Okay, one last question on this and then I have one other 
question before you proceed. Obviously a situation like that could be extremely unfair 
to a person where a person is--where you and I would react in exactly the same way, yet 
that would be used against us to hold us for a longer period of time and that is an out-
rage and we shouldn't tolerate it. On the other hand, certainly there are people who 
would be just--they are in fact violent and that is reflecting what we're trying to get 
at with the law in the first place. The question is how do you distinguish between the 
two? 
MS. MATULIS: Okay, one of the problems, too, is that it is so vague, especially 
on the 5150 level. The fact is that a person can be brought in for looking like, you 
know, violent, and under suspicion for evaluation, but that's what I think I'm trying to 
get at is that it's sa vague that when a person gets--once they get into the system all 
kinds of things can alter haw they would normally act. It's not really a good sample of 
that person's activities. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: I understand, but do you have just a simple explanation? 
Maybe it's impossible, but how does one distinguish between the two, because you're going 
to have some bona fide cases and some are really not where it's an abuse of the system. 
How do you distinguish between the two in a practical way? 
MS. MATULIS: Okay, again, like I say, within a locked setting that's an intrin-
threatening situation for many people that they might be reacting towards what 
they perceive as a threatening situation- it's hard to make that distinction- but you 
could also say that if something is obviously unprovoked, you know, if somebody is--
there's a difference between somebody who is taking an aggressive act and someone who is 
taking a defensive act. I mean, that's one distinction but I certainly don't think that 
that could account for the whole problem. 
ASSEMBLYK~ BRONZAN: Well, you're having trouble answering the question I'm 
asking and I appreciate that, it's a difficult question, but obviously 
MS. MATULIS: Could you rephrase it because I'm just having a hard time under-
standing it then. Could you 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: Well, I mean, you're obviously going to have people whose 
sickness makes them very violent and that is what the Act was trying to get at in that 
case and trying to hold those people. You know, when there's an abuse of that 
we're horrified and that's why you're doing the good work that you're doing, but what I'm 
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saying is how do you distinguish between that and the case where we need to have a hold 
of that person? I mean, maybe I'm rhetorically saying it's difficult to determine at 
times. 
MS. MATULIS: Yeah. I think so and I also think that it's important to maintain 
these external standards that are outside of clinical judgment, because if we rely too 
much on clinical judgement, as we know there's not a statistical base to pre-
dict dangerousness, and I think that that's it's--you know, like the LPS thing is 
so important to maintain, but it needs to be more specific, somehow it needs to be more 
observable. Sometimes people are violent and it has nothing to do with the mental dis-
order, but then they go--I know of a disabled woman right now who has been taking frequent 
beatings from someone and she can't even get the police to press charges against 
this person, but at the same time this person is committing a crime. Yet at the same time 
for much less observable manifestations a person can be held up indefinitely or for a 
much longer period of time. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: Okay. Let me ask one question in a different direction. 
Back earlier, a few paragraphs in your statement, you were talking about the physician, 
if I recall, who had somebody shifted from a voluntary to involuntary status, or there 
was an attempt at that and the purpose of which was so that drugs could be administered? 
MS. MATULIS: No, it was actually an involuntary patient who wanted to be there 
but was not allowed to choose voluntary treatment. Even though the law says that you can 
be able and willing to accept treatment, they were not able--there was basically a sub-
version of the law. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: They wouldn't let them go to voluntary because of the •••.• 
MS. MATULIS: Because they could have been. U.R. 'd out of there if they had re-
fused medications. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: Okay, I'm glad you clarified that - I misunderstood that. 
But let me ask a question that's related to that. Are you aware of situations where 
when a person does become--when they lose their involuntary status and become voluntary -
okay? - they become a voluntary patient, and they were at one point - that 
the point that they become voluntary that the doctor will refuse to see them because 
they're no longer covered by Medi-Cal, are you familiar with any cases like that? 
MS. MATULIS: I'm familiar with cases like--some cases like that, yes, especially 
like in the context I was just describing which was a locked facility where the doctor 
was acting like, okay, if he didn't want to accept this treatment then I 
wouldn't see him at all, and the rationale was that he would be not refundable. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: Are you aware of any cases where the Medi-Cal field office 
would define medical necessity as involuntary, therefore if it was voluntary they would 
not give a criteria of medical necessity for which a Medi-Cal reimbursement would follow? 
Do you understand what I'm saying? 
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MS. MATULIS: I do. In other words, you're that Uw be that 
're if they want to be there. Like another is if want to 
be there we won't treat 
of 
if they don't want to be there we will. That kind of--sort 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: I think I need to ask this of 
we could have a major within Medi-Cal, is what I'm 
at the state because 
out - I've heard 
this - and I just if you can substantiate it, that we end up losing Medi-Cal 
payments if the person becomes And if that's the case then that's, you know, 
there's something terribly wrong with the Medi-Cal side of it. 
MS. MATULIS: Oh, it is, but yeah, exactly, and it's like--in other words, you 
define the need for treatment by the fact that the patient wouldn't want it if they had 
a choice. I mean, it shows that that person is only there because they want to be there, 
not because they need to be there. There's some sort of implication like that which 
doesn't make a whole lot of sense, you know, especially since a lot of the service they 
need aren't really medical services. But, it's--you know, thank you for asking this 
question. I wish I could be a little more helpful. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: It's okay. I'll ask the state Medi-Cal people. 
MS. MATULIS: But as I say, the standard for danger to others is very vague - it 
does need to be specific and it needs to be upheld. What we do have needs to be upheld 
but it needs to be more specific than at the discretion of one person who goes out and 
just feels threatened and then when I asked why, couldn't even really say but just said 
the person was screaming, want to talk." You know, it would be very sensible to say 
well, let's sit down and talk, but felt that she was incapable of talking. See, if 
the standard was more , then this kind of personal discretion that affects so 
many people's lives wouldn't be allowed to exist and it really has a damaging effect on 
One of the other problems that is really related to this is the fact that there 
are no rights that are comparable to Miranda - the right to keep your 
and s to yourself. People are not told that what they say can 
and will be used against them. In fact. are pressured and badgered into revealing 
information that can then be used them and 're not any 
to remain silent and that silence is often interpreted as mutism or refusal to cooperate. 
And a lot of times people just don't want to say anything because they're afraid that 
'11 reveal 
then that's used 
that can be used against them, and so 
them, there has to be some sort of 
There was a woman that was picked up right here in Sacramento 
opt to 
of ion. 
and 
a sheriff, a Sacramento 
sheriff, and he actually told her, he says, "Well, you are really one of the only groups 
of I know of where the Bill of Rights does not apply." He looked back and said 
that to her in the back seat. He actually said that she didn't have the rights of other 
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citizens. So that is something that we really need to look at, too, even though it's 
not really part of this. But it relates because it has to do with involuntary treatment 
and if what you say in confidence, especially under pressure, when they're pressuring 
you to say things, and your deepest feelings and maybe anger, because they're trying to 
get at that and then that's turned and used you later at a ~ that 
can be really destructive. And again, it's not very 
I just want to wrap up with a brief comment on incompetence. I have the same 
sort of difficulties with the idea of to decide whether or not you need an 
evaluation. With the evaluations themselves, I sometimes really question if the evalua-
tion itself were like proved to be a real good tool that was real equitable and real 
fair and scientific and even competent, I would have a few less problems with this. But 
I had a situation where a woman came in and was on one ward of the hospital and she was 
given phenothiazines. Then she was transferred to another ward of the same hospital and 
was changed to lithium carbonate. Then she started to have little tremors so they took 
her up to the geriatric ward because they thought she was small strokes or TI's. 
They brought her to the geriatric hospital and then the psychiatrist - excuse me, the 
geriatric ward of the same hospital, the geriatric/psychiatric ward - the doctor there 
said, oh, she's not having a stroke, she's having a reaction from the lithium and then 
sent her back to the same ward. So within like two weeks this woman was seen by three 
different doctors, had three different diagnoses and had different courses of treatment. 
Now, talk about competence. I mean, this woman was not being--she was not there on her 
own free will. Now, who's less ? The woman who's this treatment or the 
people who are doing all these strange things to her? And thenbythe time she was 
finished she was so confused and so muddled by the reactions of the drugs that she was 
in worse than she was when she came in. And so I do have difficulty talking 
about competence to accept an evaluation that's to begin with. 
I just want to wrap up by saying that I think that the LPS is a really good start. 
I think it really needs to be much more clear. I think that the of people need 
to be protected and that the treatment of who are in this system needs to be pro-
tected. The fact that a person can be an involuntary patient and not even be explained 
right now, they don't even need to be explained what the drugs are doing and why they're 
doing, and a lot of times they don't understand the effects. There is no informed con-
sent for involuntary patients. And there's a woman in Napa right now who is there because 
somebody determined that she wasn't competent to stand trial for a small theft. Her 
lawyer believes that she would be out right now, except that because a doctor made a 
determination she wasn't competent to cooperate with her attorney, she's in Napa and she's 
there for much longer than she would have to be if she were facing charges. 
So I think that we really do need to look at this and thank you very much for 
your attention. 
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SENATOR MCCORQUODALE: Thank you. We your comments. Are there any 
ions? Okay, very good. We thank you. I would just say for everyone's knowledge, 
if you could provide us with a written statement it would be ful, and anyone else 
who would like to either provide on the same issues or their own comments, if they could 
them in by October 15th we would include them in the record Very good, thank you. 
MS. MATULIS: Thank you. 
SENATOR MCCORQUODALE: All right, our next will be 
and legal issues. We have Byron Chell, who's the author of 
about clinical 
a Decade of LPS -
Uncertain Times in Mental Health Law." We have Dave Neyer, Head Deputy Public Defender of 
Los Angeles County. There's the person for your question. Captane Thomson, M.D., 
California Psychiatric Association, and Beverly Abbott, President of the Conference of 
Local Mental Health Directors. Do you want to go in the order that I called you? 
MR. BYRON CHELL: Yes. Good morning. I'm Byron Chell. I do have some background 
in mental health legal issues. I'm the former chief counsel of the Department of Mental 
Health. I served for three-and-a-half years in that capacity. I'm now in private prac-
tice in the Sacramento area and have no continuing formal involvement in the mental health 
community. So I'm representing no one today except my own views, I will say that. I 
always thought I was impartial before but I'm sure I'm impartial now. 
I have lots to say about this stuff, a tremendous amount to say about it. I've 
spent much, much time thinking about it. I still do. I do have a continuing involvement 
and then I teach law medicine and ethics at the University of California Davis Law School 
and we do deal with involuntary commitment issues, because it is a good example of areas 
that confront society involving law, medicine, ethics, even morality and theology if you 
want to start talking about the areas of individual responsibility and what all that 
means in taking away that individual freedom. 
I won't say I have to say about this. I did do an of LPS -
of it are available- it's 114 pages long. I will say that it seems to me that 
that was said in that at that time three years ago is just as relevant today 
and I stand those conclusions. The only that doesn't need to be dealt 
\rvith is the area relating to Gallinot and the lementation of certification review 
Now, also there are many people in this room who are probably tired of hearing 
me talk about all of these issues and how they relate. 
I think it's important for everyone to realize the of these issues. 
We s with these issues because they are simply very difficult and if we don't 
understand them, you know, I would like to tell people that's okay, we don't 
understand them because they're very difficult. This is one of those areas confronting 
society where we have rights and conflict. All the difficult social issues confronting 
in our society involve rights and conflict, whether it be abortion, prayer in 
school, civil commitment, some of these other bio-medical/ethical issues. 
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In other words, regardless of what side you take on the issue, you can point to some 
fundamental concepts and fundamental rights and moral issues and all of this to buttress 
your argument. So they're tough issues and we have to recognize that. 
Also, I have so much to say that perhaps I'd be better at answering questions or 
responding to concerns. I 've heard much already that I could respond to but I won't. 
What I'm going to do is just make some general comments, very general comments concerning 
some of the problems that seem to me still us that faced us three years ago. 
Basically, I think the LPS Act is still quite sound. What I mean, I don't think we need 
another revolution in the mental health law that came along in 1969 with the LPS Act. 
It's a pretty good act. This is evidenced by the fact that as was stated earlier, 
virtually every state in this country has adopted mental health laws based on the LPS 
Act. However, we've had 15 years experience now working with this Act so we've learned 
some things. And it was because of that, when I did the analysis, we called it, "After 
a Decade of LPS," so we've had a few more years experience. So we ought to think about 
our experience and where our real problems are and what we're really trying to do to see 
if we need to make any changes. 
Let me just touch shortly on four different areas: Civil commitment criteria, 
the procedures, the right to refuse treatment and children - just very brief comments. 
In regard to civil commitment criteria, as you've heard, we can involuntarily civilly 
commit somebody in California if they're a to others, danger to self or gravely 
disabled. It seems to me that well, again, I ve discussed all of this in detail in 
this analysis so I'm not going to go into it all - theoretically it would be nice, I 
think, if we did something with the danger to self, gravely disabled concept. I think 
conceptually they're very similar to one another and we have some confusion around the 
state in applying them. In other words, who's to be considered gravely disabled, who 
is to be considered danger to self, and what's the difference here? I don't think it's 
necessary but it might be nice if we thought about that a little bit. This is a very 
difficult area, also, because of the different perspectives involved. I mean, the per-
spective of family members is going to be very different from the patients who are 
brought into the involuntary commitment system, as the perspective of the legal pro-
fession is very different from the perspective of the clinical profession. And it's very 
important to understand that all of those perspectives are legitimate and we have to 
attempt to put ourselves in those shoes and understand there are other perspectives so 
that we can achieve the balance that's required. Again, it's because we're talking about 
an area, we're talking about rights and conflict. Society has got to come up with a 
balance, what's the proper balance~ and I think that's what LPS is looking for, that's 
what we're still looking for. And as Barbara Lurie said, the fact that there is con-
tinuing debate from all the different sides can either be an example that either 
something's wrong or something's right. I think it's a good example that something's 
right here. 
I don't see the need for any radical changes to our civil commitment criteria 
to either danger to others, danger to self or gravely disabled. It is somewhat 
vague but I don't think you can do about that. There is to be differences 
but I don't think the can solve that. I think you can 
solve that by education, training, that type of stuff. There's very little education 
and training in regard to what involuntary civil commitment is all about. You know, 
what's the concept behind this, what are we trying to do and why, or what is the legal 
basis, the constitutional basis, what are we trying to find, what must we find? So in 
summary, I don't think we have to do a lot there. That is my opinion. 
In regard to procedures, you heard that we have a system, you know we have a sys-
tem where we have 72-hours, 14-days, and then depending on what your classification is 
you can go different ways. I would like to say, and it was discussed back in '80 and '81, 
serious consideration be given to the idea of extending the initial 14-day certification 
to maybe 21 or 28 days. Did lots of talking about this - there's some compelling argu-
ments for doing that- there are some arguments for not doing it- but it's something 
that I still think would be deserving of serious consideration, especially now that we 
have automatic certification review hearings upfront which, theoretically, should add 
more protection to the rights of the patient being involuntarily detained. 
The right to refuse treatment - this issue has confounded the mental health com-
munity for five, six, seven, eight years. I'm still amazed personally at how much con-
fusion is still caused by this concept and the litigation that's gone on around con-
cerning it. First, the right to refuse treatment, in my opinion, is not about the right 
to refuse treatment at all. What I mean by that, and as I've continually said, it is 
not going to be--we're not going to get to a situation where we have involuntary commit-
ments of people that you cannot involuntarily treat. That's not what involuntary civil 
commitment is about. It's about involuntary civil commitment for treatment purposes. 
Again, we could talk about this for a long time, but the right-to-refuse-treatment cases 
are all about is what procedures must you follow before you can involuntarily detain 
All right? I think it's very important to understand. 
This brings us right to the issue if incapacity and incompetency. Now, there is 
absolutely no way to justify involuntary detention and forceable treatment without making 
a finding that the person isn't capable of making these care and treatment decisions for 
themselves. You cannot justify it legally, ethically or morally. If you don't take 
that position then you have to take the position that it's okay to involuntarily detain 
a person and forceably treat them with anti-psychotic medications perhaps, even though 
we think that they're capable or competent to make these decisions for themselves. That's 
absurd! We have to make this finding - that concept - you know, arriving at that con-
clusion is fairly easy. The difficult part is trying to implement it either legislatively 
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or administratively. Again, I spent much time in the analysis talking about this problem 
and the need to make this type of a finding- if you do make it, what's it mean? It 
certainly shouldn't mean a finding of incompetency for all purposes - it should be a 
very limited funding. We have to talk about substitute decision-makers and we have to 
keep in mind, you know, if we're to it we have to implement it in a 
system that is workable. We can't be judicial for everybody cer-
tified for 14 days, for example. It's a very issue. I still have that to 
about that issue - we must make that finding because we are not in the business of 
forceably treating patients who are capable of making these decisions for themselves. 
It's that simple. Now implementing is a little bit more difficult. 
say 
In regard to children, we have some comments relating to children. The Roger S. 
decision is a very difficult decision. With certification review hearings in place, I 
can see that it would be much easier to implement that system in regard to children right 
now. However, I'm not sure it ought to be done because there are still some very troub-
ling issues surrounding that decision, and my personal opinion is I would like to see 
the Roger s. question relitigated. I don't think it' was adequately dealt with. I don't 
think that's going to happen but I really don't have anything to offer, anything new to 
offer in regard to the problem of children right now. 
Well, again, I have lots to say about all of this. My experience is that the 
problems that we encounter in this system - we hear instances of individual abuse perhaps 
or something went wrong, horror stories - but this is generally not the result of anything 
wrong with the LPS Act. It's generally a result of, you know, not understanding what the 
Act is all about, not understanding what society is all about in having an involuntary 
commitment system - a lack of education - something went wrong. You know, what I mean 
by this is I don't think I've ever heard a horror story or an abuse story where I couldn't 
identify what went wrong here and it's not the statute. I mean, this person simply--
you know, the police officer did something wrong or the officer or the judge 
really didn't understand what ought to be done here so it's that type of thing. So I'm 
not going to sit here today as I did back in 1980 or '81 to say that we need massive 
changes to LPS. 
My experience in the mental health system is that the problems, the real problems 
relating to the mentally ill, you know, are not these legal problems. These are inter-
esting problems, they're fascinating for lawyers and they're fascinating if you're 
interested in ethical and moral and legal principles and all of that. But these aren't 
where the real problems are. I always saw the problems to be around -and we've heard 
some of them today already - the problem surrounding the lack of continuity of care, for 
example. Problems surrounding the stigma of mental illness. I still see that as a 
tremendous problem. The public of this seems to me is look, we want you to 
take care of these people and we don't want these weird people on the street, so we want 
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you to take care of them - we don't want to hear any horror stories or abuse, you know, 
all that horrible stuff going on in the state hospitals, so we want you to take care of 
them, take care of them well; but listen, don't spend too much money and don't do it in 
my neighborhood. And if there's one thing I think that you as legislators can help do 
is whatever you can do to dispel this notion that most mentally ill people present a 
to others. You heard the statistics today they're surpris statistics - 196 
people statewide on the basis of danger to others. By far, by far the people who are 
held in the involuntary commitment system are people who for one reason or another can't 
care for themselves. They're no danger to you, to me or to our children. They simply 
for one reason or another can't care for themselves. The public perception is just the 
opposite. If they're mentally ill, they present some kind of danger, you know, do some-
thing about them. 
So then the lack of resources, the lack of social services, how many people are 
in involuntary civil commitment in acute care settings, when what they really need is 
some help with the problems of living - either they don't know how to find a place to 
live, they don't know how to shop. What they need is social services perhaps, not 
acute care. That doesn't mean we don't have people who don't need to be involuntary 
committed and involuntary treated in an acute setting, but I often wonder how many could 
be helped out of that system with additional social services. 
Well, like I said, I could go on forever. Those are my written comments. I 
still stand by them and I'll just shut up at this point. 
SENATOR MCCORQUODALE: All right, very good, thank you. Dave? 
MR. DAVE MEYER: Thank you. I'm David Meyer. My job description on the agenda 
is accurate but I would like to make clear that Los Angeles County, of which the public 
defender is a function, has not taken positions in any of these matters. So these are 
my own views, although I look forward to being involved on behalf of several groups 
these discussions as they go on. 
I have some eight plus years as an attorney for mentally disabled individuals in 
LPS proceedings, developmental disability proceedings, penal code proceedings relating 
to the mentally ill and similar proceedings, and I'm willing to answer questions or make 
comments about any of those areas that I can help shed light on because of my experience. 
I have a particularly strong feeling, however, about one area, and that is the 
area of mental health treatment as it relates to children. I strongly feel, I have felt 
for years, I will continue as long as I am in this field to continue to believe that 
government has a particular responsibility to protect children in this area. It is a 
responsibility that arises from the obvious. First, children are legally disabled as 
individuals. Someone under the age of 18 years is legally disabled by definition. 
, an individual who is under the age of 18 years and who has severe mental dis-
has additional problems for which government I think ought to have a responsi-
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bility. I do not think it is enough and I think the law supports me in this area, to say 
that these kinds of problems can be solved in private settings and by the family alone. 
There is especially amongst needy families and for needy children a need to pro-
vide systems and treatment. They do not exist now. That is not a deficit of the LPS Act, 
? 
it is not a deficit of the Lanterman-D.D. Act$ it is a deficit of available funding and 
available facilities; and, of course, you've heard that sawover and over again today and 
you'll hear it over and over again, I'm sure, as time goes on. There does need to be 
revision of some of the gatekeeping functions in the LPS system and we can get into that 
in more detail. But there needs to be the ability of children who are disabled children 
who have severe problems to get into the system. It is difficult now. Again, not espe-
cially because there is a deficit in the law but because there are deficits in the organ-
izations, institutions, bureaucracies that deal in these areas. 
Secondly, there is a need to protect children in another way, and I would emphasize 
in this area especially the vulnerability of children because of their legal disability, 
and that is to protect children against abuses in the private sector. There are, although 
these are hidden, rather--there are large numbers, a rather vast system, if you will, 
of privately funded juvenile halls that are licensed to function because they have li-
censes as mental health treatment facilities. Children are in them, receiving rather 
severe forms of behavior modification therapy, if you will, behavioral technology at its 
utmost. These children are artificially labeled as mentally disordered, mentally ill. 
They are permanently, publicly and forever branded as mentally ill people. There is no 
regulation that is meaningful of these institutions. There is no body which on a regu-
lar basis checks to see if they're operating properly. There is no voice of the Legis-
lature, of the people of the State of California of the manner in which they are operated 
or the manner in which the children who are held in them are treated. 
In order to address both of these problems there is a need to address certain 
unanswered questions, certain issues. These issues must be addressed and I beg to differ 
with my colleague, Byron Chell. These issues must be addressed by the Legislature and not 
by the courts. 1977, the case of RogerS. was handed down by the California Supreme 
Court. There was no mechanism suggested by the Supreme Court for implementing the deci-
sion except that the Supreme Court in a footnote suggested, well, the Legislature will 
take care of it. It is now 1984. I have personally been involved in at least three 
attempts to take care of it - it has not happened. The problem has not only continued to 
exist, it has grown to the point where it is possible that it can't be addressed 
at all. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: What is taking care of it? I mean, what's the resolution? 
MR. MEYER: There is a need for legislation to address the problem of individuals 
who are not mentally disordered being in mental hospitals. There needs to be a mechanism 
to prevent individuals who are not mentally ill from being artificially labeled as such, 
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held for very long periods of time in these kinds of institutions and forever 
suffer the stigma of that done. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: Are you about children? 
MR. MEYER: Children. Now, these are not LPS commitments. 
mitments. Someone walks up to the door of a mental 
They're private com-
themself in. There 
Court known as a imilar with a case handed down the California 
in re 
this 
That decision that there be - in a manner very similar to 
way - that there be a determination to hospitalization of the need 
We still do not have ion in that area. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: I ask a 
and I'm afraid I don't. You re 
about private commitments. 
MR. MEYER: That's correct. 
ASSEMBL~~ BRONZAN: Of a minor to a 
I want to make sure that I understand 
about not LPS commitments; you're 
institution. 
MR. HEYER: In respect to the RogerS. phenomenon, if you will, (quote, unquote). 
in re Irene Hop relates to hospitalizations in state itals for developmentally 
disabled But in re yes. down-the-street mental with 40 
beds in it that's licensed by the state under Section 1250 of the Health and 
Code - I don't like the way my child is behaving -perhaps they're staying out 
too late, they're a runaway, use too much alcohol, they're sexually promiscuous, 
a of other - I march my child on down to my corner hospital, knock on the 
front door, them admitted and might there for • ten, fourtheen months. 
ASSEMBLYt~ BRONZAN: 
determines involuntary at that 
refusal? 
, I need to understand before you go on. Who 
? Is it the 1 refusal, or the child's 
MR. HEYER: 
describe this. 
, the terms and are ill-suited to 
ASSEHBLYl"~ BRONZAN: don't make much sense here. 
HR. HEYER: They make no sense whatsoever. 
ASSEHBLYj\~ BRONZAN: So a can just go and take their child for whatever 
reason have that child committed to a that's like a locked men-
- is that so far? 
. HEYER: It is a locked ..... 
ASSEHBLY~~ BRONZAN It is a locked mental health , and then you said, 
also, that that child can be labeled by that doctor and that facility 
disabled? 
MR. MEYER: must be labeled mentally disabled, otherwise the admission is 
, inappropriate. 
ASSEMBLYHAN BRONZAN what standard is it ? 
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}'lR. MEYER: Section 6000 of the Welfare and Institutions Code requires that that 
person be a suitable person for admission to a mental health hospital. Obviously, some-
one who is not physically ill should not be in a general hospital. One who is not 
mentally ill should not be in a mental health hospital. 
ASSEHBLYMAN BRONZAN: means must be declared mentally disabled 
or something like that, and then they are tagged and then the hospital and there's no 
control over the person. 
}'IR. MEYER: They must be diagnosed as having a mental disorder, which is, as you've 
I think gathered from other testimony, a rather simple process. The process of diagnosing 
mental disability is a process of simply describing the obvious by fancy words. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: So all of the hoops that we jump through in LPS don't apply 
at all to what you're describing. 
}'IR, MEYER: That's correct. There are no hoops. Do not pass go, do not collect 
$200, the door slams shut behind you for an indefinite period. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: Based solely really on the parents' desire. 
MR. MEYER: Well, I would quarrel with that, although that's the legal theory. 
Usually parents are attracted to these situations either by the recommendation of a men-
tal health professional or by advertising on television, magazines, newspapers, etc. -
bring your misbehaving child to our mental health hospital and we will cure him of the 
misbehavior. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: Okay. 
MR. MEYER: There is a need, as one who believes strongly in the rights of mentally 
disabled people and one who has fought for them in the courts and elsewhere for many 
years, I can see the need for there to be mechanisms to address the so-called Michael E. 
problem - the inability of juvenile courts to take individuals who are either dependent 
children or who are wards and find for them within the system appropriate mental health 
treatment. There is, unfortunately, a substantial number of young people in Los Angeles 
County, many of them held in our own McClaren Hall, who are there not because their 
parents are incapable of providing for them but because their disabilities are so great, 
their mental health problems are so severe, that they must be locked up somewhere and 
there is no other place to get them the help. There is a need in the juvenile system 
to have mechanisms to address this problem. 
I might say to you that the LPS Act does have provision for addressing the prob-
lems of mentally ill children. There is a special definition for 11mentally ill minor" 
which is rather more broad in many ways than the definition for adults. There might well 
be the need to address that definition so that we can more easily and more accurately 
identify those children who should be in the system. But I would say also that there is 
an equivalent need to identify those children who should not be in the system. The LPS 
Act, as it operates in respect to minors, operates as it does now, and I am including 
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in re Michael E. in these comments. It operates as it does now because of the massive, 
pervasive abuses of in ls to LPS and to in re 
Hichael E. State mental hospitals are not a to address the needs of misbehaving 
children. State mental cannot do that and they do not want to do that, yet 
very often 're the places 're the of last result and the only 
available for some children who have severe behavioral , severe 
mental problems. 
Any law that addresses Michael E. and related issues must not only 
address the need that has been created, but address the need to prevent a return to the 
kinds of abuses that we had to the LPS Act. I have no other formal comments. 
SENATOR MCCORQUODALE: All we're going to take a brief recess. 
- RECESS -
SENATOR MCCORQUODALE: All , we're ready to start again. Now we will go 
down to Dr. Thomson. 
DR. CAPTANE THOMSON: Mr. Chairman, I'm Dr. Captane Thomson. I'm Director of 
Mental Health in Yolo County and I'm here representing the California Psychiatric 
Association. And I will be drawing from the model state statute for mental commitment of 
the American Psychiatric Association that was approved in 1982 for some suggestions about 
changes in criteria and procedures. 
The most frustrating thing to those of us who have to testify, and for families, 
is that our testimony does not relate to the central issue in commitment hearings, and 
that is the need for a severely mentally ill person to be treated to prevent deteriora-
tion. I would agree with Byron Chell about the issue of grave disability and danger to 
self could be collapsed, and I would suggest that in combining them that we also consider 
adding the additional criterion that the person be likely to cause harm to himself or 
to suffer substantial mental or emotional deterioration. 
Now, the way that would work, our present 14-day certification on medical grounds 
would be by a 30-day commitment. The 30-day commitment would be made by the 
court, not based on the psychiatrist's certification alone. The court would have to make 
the following findings: 
1. That the person suffers from a severe mental disorder; 
2. That the disorder is treatable and that the treatment will take place in the 
least restrictive alternative setting; 
3. If the person refuses or is unable to consent to treatment voluntarily; 
4. The person lacks the capacity to make an informed decision; and 
5. The person is likely to cause harm to himself or suffers substantial mental 
or emotional deterioration, or likely to cause harm to others. 
final recommendation would be that commitments should be made to treatment 
whether that treatment be on an , day-patient or out-patient basis. In other 
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words, we should provide commitment to out-patient treatment as well as to confine that 
we should unlink commitment from confinement. 
SENATOR MCCORQUODALE: How would you, Doctor, respond to testimony from the 
Patient Rights Advocate, Colette Hughes, who felt fairly strongly that involuntary 
detention and forced treatment do not 
in fact, contribute to it? Is that your 
down the suicide rate and that it might, 
also? 
DR. THOMSON: Well, of course, those of us who are see many 
people who are acutely suicidal during a crisis who are brought in for treatment and 
who as a result of treatment are thankful that they've been rescued. Many people have 
taken overdoses of sleeping pills, for example. When they recover they're grateful that 
they've been treated and rescued. So I believe that one of our duties to our neighbors 
is to try to help them when they're not able to help themselves. 
SENATOR MCCORQUODALE: The comment was made that the 30-day period of time is 
adequate to determine if a person is really suicidal or if it's just an attention 
gainer. Would that be your opinion also? 
DR. THOMSON: By and large, people who are acutely suicidal can be treated within 
the--well, now we have the 3 days plus 14 plus another 14, a total of 31 days. It's 
rare that we have to let somebody go knowing that he's determined to kill himself. That 
can happen, but I've never had a case. 
SENATOR MCCORQUODALE: What about the issue that we shouldn't force treatment on 
a person without the specific finding that the person is 
decision? 
DR. THOMSON: I think that both the Gallinot - the 
now - and the Jamison argument that a person's capacity to 
of making a treatment 
cause hearing we have 
informed consent should 
be determined, but they should be determined, in my opinion, by the judge at the time of 
commitment and that commitment should occur immediately after the emergency detention. 
So a person would be held as an emergency- if there's a decision to keep them longer, 
say for a 30-day commitment, then that should be a court determination. I think now 
we're having all kinds of (inaudible) court decisions. We have probable cause hearing 
officers, we have independent psychiatrists doing these evaluations - I think it would 
be much less expensive and much more--and would guarantee people their legal rights much 
more clearly if this were done upfront at the time of the initial commitment. 
SENATOR MCCORQUODALE: All right, thank you. Any other questions? 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: Not right now. 
SENATOR MCCORQUODALE: All right. Beverly Abbott. 
MS. BEVERLY ABBOTT: Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm Beverly Abbott. I'm 
President of the Conference of Mental Health Directors currently and the Mental Health 
Director for Marin County, California. I would like to make some general comments and 
then a few specific ones. 
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the questions that you re asking today, as you've said in the written 
material you sent out, are too to answer in one , and it's good that you'll 
have the task force format. We that we will have an opportunity as people who work 
in this to on those task forces and to discuss the issues in more 
But I would like to say a few 
be looked at. 
about the context in which those issues 
I agree with many of the that have been said here this The first 
that a voluntary connection with the is always And while I think we 
assume that, I think it's sometimes easy to lose sight of how often that is pos-
sible. Marin County has the highest per capita of funding on the property population 
model So we have a small well-funded and it's easier to see that the 
more resources you have the mare you're able to reach out to a client to offer voluntary 
alternatives. Many clients who in a more pressured system who might not respond do re-
spond under that system. Even in the most optimal of situations, however, you will have 
clients who society has to make that decision for them, because without care and treatment 
would go out in the street and not care for themselves at all, perhaps be hit in 
traffic or any number of horrible things. 
The second point I'd like to make in general context is that however you look at 
LPS, and we look at LPS, it's important to do that, understanding how the limits of our 
knowledge about mental illness - and in your first hearing I think you had some expert 
on the nature of mental illness, the complexity of it, the many factors -
as people in administering this system. The way that that translates on a day-
to-day basis is that you're often not sure what will happen with patients. So in pre-
for coming up here today I talked with several of my best clinical staff - these 
are highly trained people with a lot of experience - and also being in a small system 
who know patients individually - and the is how good are we at predicting 
what will happen with someone over the next few months. And on suicidality and danger-
ousness, my staff had to say, you know, we're really no better than chance often at 
And on grave , if we know the patients well, maybe we are as 
as 70 in saying this person will deteriorate without, but that still means that 
we're wrong 30 times in 100. So within that context we are a system where 
we have to be humble about when we're 
person's liberties. 
a person's liberty, or taking away a 
The third general context statement, as an administrator of this , it is 
very hard and the reality of being both the treater and the person who takes, or the 
people who take away the patients' liberties is a constant moral, ethical, professional 
dilemma everyday, so that you really--society has charged us with saying you are both 
responsible for making sure the person's liberties are protected in the system and you're 
responsible for treating the person involuntarily. And it's a very difficult juncture 
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and at least perhaps some thought should be given to separating those two things. Now 
having said that I must also say I don't have any helpful suggestions to give 
you. But I think it's worth a certain amount of discussion in recognizing the tension 
that creates. 
I agree with what's been said a of the testifiers that 
if the person is committed to the without the to treat that person, the 
only function we're performing is a social control function and that is not--that's an 
unnatural act for the mental health system for treaters in the mental health system, so 
that whatever the determination, if you hold someone against their wills it does make 
sense to say that then you are able to do whatever - you know, to the extent of the limits 
of your knowledge do what you know or what you have evidences of the best thing to do. 
But if you commit someone to us and then say at the same time you can't do the things 
that you know - for example, medication with an acute psychotic episode - that would be 
a terribly difficult situation and result in a ward where people both voluntarily treated 
and involuntarily treated who maybe would not take medication you'd have a patient--you'd 
have a very difficult treatment situation. 
Having said those things as context, I think that on the whole specifically the 
criteria for treating the mentally ill in involuntary holds are fairly adequate with some 
exceptions. They are not adequate for children, as has been spoken to, and that obviously 
needs review and study and that occurs because of the confusion about what's the 
parents' rights versus what's the child s rights, and that situation needs to be corrected. 
The system would probably be improved if you could have a second 14-day hold on 
grave disability. In some counties there is, I guess, a 
ships as a way to hold individuals beyond the first 14 
14-day hold period that may be sufficient for some clients. 
of temporary conservator-
And if you had a second 
You may still go into the 
permanent conservatorship, but that might make an improvement in the system. 
In terms of court testimony. of the problem with conservatorships, and this 
may apply to the other two categories also, is judges interpret the law differently so 
that when you go to court, if you're dealing with a reasonable j - reasonable as 
our opinion - that you can present evidence and you are able to get conservatorships. If 
you have a judge that takes a very strict interpretation - for example, a moment in time -
they have a client before them and they say at this moment of time this individual is 
all right and can provide food, clothing and shelter - we have had that individual 
and treated them for five days - then that individual is released and they may go down-
hill. Another judge will take a lot of testimony about the history. In large counties 
it's a tremendous problem if the record can't be admitted as evidence because in a smaller 
system - like our clinical director knows all of the clients that come through the crisis 
units, so he goes, he testifies- it's sometimes easier in a large system where you can 
admit the chart. You would have to have so many people in court to establish a history. 
So there's some there, but the system, I think if it works the 
it was intended to I think does work for 
to others is a that doesn't work very well, we think. And the 
there is the mental health If the dangerous behavior flows from the 
mental illness itself such as someone who has a delusion that can be saved cut-
someone's throat - that's a that comes up in different forms from 
time to time with patients - is that that individual, that flows from the 
mental illness. There is a situation that I can think of where there's an individual 
who we consider to be He has a DSM-3 but it doesn't flow from a 
specific part of his mental illness. And those are very fine differentiations to get 
into and maybe we're not always about them, but the problem that you have is if 
that individual's committed to the mental health system, what is the mental health system 
go to do anyway? In other words, unless you can specifically say how you see the 
dangerous--what the cause of the dangerousness is and what you can do to treat it, then 
you have someone coming into the system and you have a very--you are not--if it's not a 
treatable illness then you have an impossible situation. So the issue of danger to 
others should be looked at carefully from the of view of what function is the 
mental health system supposed to serve, and I think many of us in it feel that that is 
not a function that we serve well. 
You looked with surprise, I think, Assemblyman Bronzan, at the figures, the number 
f holds of danger to others, and even with the new criteria, the '83-84, I don't think 
you're going to see a large increase in that. It's difficult to get in court, it's 
difficult to prove, it's difficult to be about. Our strongest hold with people 
who are comes from the criminal justice So if you have peop 
who have committed crimes against society, frequently individuals who are dangerous 
because of a mental disorder, that's your hold. Mental health is often most 
effective when we're with the criminal justice which has 
much s than LPS does. And with children, , as it's been said, 
that those criterion need revision. 
I think it's to look at, , whether or not individuals accept treat-
ment in what we have to offer, and also what causes them to come to us. Several people 
have about housing, failure of SSI, other things - those I think are tremendously 
Chell talked about and the community supports - those things 
are about into 
you could 
treatment. That doesn't 
to everyone. There are some and would stil 
involuntary treatment. But, again, in a small system it's easy to see, if you 
can in early with housing and money management, how often people have more choices. 
Thank you. 
SENATOR MCCORQUODALE: All , very good. Thank you. Any questions? 
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ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: I've got one question. Of all of you, briefly, because of 
where you all represent and your backgrounds, I'm just curious about one thing, just in 
your opinion, what is the - two things - what is the scope of the problem, or the per-
centage of the problem, whatever the easiest way to answer it, of those that need treat-
ment but aren't getting it that are somehow one way or another from getting 
it? And then, secondly, particularly with your , what's the scope or the 
percentage of the problem of those that get committed that shouldn't be 
that don't belong there? Is there just a simple opinion answer that each of you can 
give me on that? 
DR. THOMSON: That's a wonderful You re a number of false 
positives and false negatives. That is~ how many are being falsely committed who 
are really not mentally ill, and how many severely mentally ill people who would fit the 
criteria are not getting treatment. There are very few people who are not seriously 
mentally ill who remain in the mental health system beyond the 72-hours. People can 
be picked up and brought to the hospital and then after three days released, and that 
may occur - they may be an alcoholic in a delirious state - they may be suffering from 
toxicity from drugs or there may be other reasons. But the 72-hours, there are 
very few people who remain. And with our probable cause hearing mechanism now, people 
are screened down so the very many seriously mentally ill people are not kept because 
they don't meet the strict criteria of danger to self, others, or grave disability. And 
grave disability, remember, is limited to food, or shelter, not safety or health 
or other more general considerations. Then there's about the likelihood to 
deteriorate emotionally or mentally. Those considerations are not part of the probable 
cause hearing officer's responsibility. 
Now, on the other side, we have, as you know, the depopulation, deinstitutionali-
zation of our state hospitals. Everybody who walks downtown in any major city sees 
numerous untreated severely disturbed people. The problem of the homeless is a very 
major social and economic problem now in the United States, and many of the homeless are 
seriously mentally ill, people who are not treatment. You know about the lady 
who died in the cold in New York City because she was 
arrived to finally, with a court order, to take her in 
in a box. The day that they 
found her dead. So we are 
leaning over backwards to permit patients to stay in the community and we're allowing 
them to die with their rights on. 
ASSEMBLYMJu~ BRONZAN: How about the other side capped real quickly - what per-
centage of the folks from just your point of view that get committed that really shouldn't 
be. 
DR. THOMSON: I think that those who are committed--well, those who are held in 
the hospital beyond three days, I think the proportion would be almost negligible. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: Okay. 
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MS. ABBOTT: I think that for those who are committed or who stay in the system 
that shouldn't be, I think in the better funded programs you might find some people on 
conservatorship longer than if you took strictly a 's rights point of view than 
was necessary. But that is the exception. I think LPS does function to us 
from holding against their will and there are a number of different assurances of 
I think the people who aren't getting treatment, I am not convinced and their s. 
haven't seen a lot of evidence that that's so much a fallout of LPS as it is from the 
resource, because the woman who dies in a box would she have lived in a clean 
hotel the opportunity and three meals a So I think that on the involuntary 
treatment that's a very hard one to assess without looking at the resources. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZru~: Dave? 
MR. MEYER: I think you have to keep in mind that the operative mechanism of LPS 
is not treatment. You don't lock someone up for treatment you lock them up because of 
their behavior. That is a decision that the Legislature made years ago and one which is 
absolutely set in stone now I think socially in terms of the system. Therefore, when you 
go into the hospital you will find people who almost uniformally need treatment because 
of the severity of their behavior and therefore you have very few misses. The LPS system 
functions very well on that level. Therefore, those who are in) if you will, there are 
very few misfirings. I think that is a credit to LPS. On the other hand, I can't say 
that I agree because I am looking, I think, at a sample which is much broader, that 
everyone who is in the hospital therefore should be there as I've mentioned. There's a 
whole sub rosa mental health system (quote, unquote) which has people within it who are 
not ill in anyway that you or I think would accept it. They have what are known 
as adjustment reactions, which is merely another way to describe that they're mischievous, 
misbehaved, a variety of other things. They may be even anti-social. They may even be 
crimes. But ill? I don't think that most folks other than those 
need to use the DSM-3 would accept that. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: Okay. 
MR. CHELL: This concept of need for treatment as being a commitment criteria is 
a difficult one. A concept in conjunction with some of our criteria is all 
to talk about, but to talk about civil commitment on the basis that a person is, for 
example, mentally ill and in need of treatment, that's incorrect. I think we ought to 
see this problem, see involuntary commitment of the ill as the same as invol-
somebody for a medical condition. As far as I m concerned, the con-
are identical. That is, you cannot force a person to have their leg amputated un-
less you make a finding that their medical condition puts them in some type of a danger-
ous situation and they are not capable of making decisions in to that treatment. 
I mean, the fact that a person is in need of medical treatment is not sufficient to force 
treatment upon them. The same way the fact that a person is in need of and could 
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benefit from mental health or treatment is not sufficient in and of itself, 
even though we think it's a terrific idea, it s not sufficient to override the indi-
vidual's choice. We have to find that are in some of dangerous 
situation and can't make these decisions for themselves. It takes a time discussing 
this stuff to it all out. 
Regarding the other side, my never that you--you kno\.;r, you don 1 t 
see people - clinicians - you know, 
these decisions lightly to civilly commit 
these decisions or making 
This is stuff and my 
experience is that they treat it that way. That doesn't mean that aren't 
committed who perhaps don't need to be committed. After , we must remember 
that we are simply human beings very difficult decisions about other human beings. 
I hear just as many, and I've heard just as many 
hear them from the family. It's not that so many 
as you don't keep them in or clinicians don't 
balance. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: I talked with many 
that, you know--well, you 
are getting in inappropriately 
them in. And then, again, it's a 
in my own but two people 
who have about this one in which I received this morning - is a 
public defender who handles your in my and his was that it's 
a slam dunk for the county at those don't have resources to bring 
anybody else in on the other side. So when the 's , or whoever 
testifies or whether it's written or whatever, on behalf of person committed, 
there's nothing else on the other side and it's a slam dunk as far as he's con-
cerned. I asked him was that I mean, that may not sound good but relative 
them or not, is that appropriate, to the people who are going there, whether he's 
and he felt that in most cases it was, that in fact there. But he felt 
that there's 10 to 15 percent that he's not sure about and for them 
he's not sure that they belong there at all. But there's 
about it with his limitation on resouces. I think it's an 
's unfair, and 
nothing he can do 
comment. 
The other comment was that in our , many feel that it is so 
overcrowded that so many people are not there or not as as they should 
be because of just the sheer volume versus the resources that are there to deal with 
them, that it's nowhere near as many as there to be relative to the need out there 
and that you have to be very, very, very sick to in because of backing up of 
that level of severity. I mean, it will take a time to sort all these 
things out. 
One thing I think that's extremely that's been raised several times by 
the panel before you and, again, by you, , is that one that skews all this 
and oranges and to sort it all out is just the and makes it difficult to compare 
lack of treatment capability And if you had a much range and continuity 
~so-
of care, as you mentioned, in every community that could be accessible voluntarily, that 
would dramatically skew the whole concept of involuntary treatment. And I think as long 
as we're dealing with that basis with essent a desert out there of good treatment 
for people, we will be forever plagued with these more impossible-to-resolve-
to issues for LPS and involuntary commitment. 
SENATOR MCCORQUODALE: All , very Thank you, we your 
We need to take a short break now for the 1 the stenographer 
to relax a moment, and then we will take up the panel on the system's monitors. 
- BREAK -
SENATOR MCCORQUODALE: All right, we're ready to resume. We'll now go to Panel 3. 
Helen Teisher, President of the California Alliance of the Ill, and Jack 
Cunningham, Citizens Advisory Council, and Derek Washington. Dr. Washington's with the 
Mental Health Association of California. Helen, you want to start out? 
MS. HELEN TEISHER: Thank you. We consider this a real opportunity and thank 
it. 
I could spend a lot of time reacting to the people who have already spoken, but 
I will restrain myself. I must react to the statement that was made that it was most 
often the families who want to lock up their mentally ill relatives. That is not what 
we want to do. It is not truthful nor accurate to state that families will accrue 
or condone insensitive or inhumane treatment in facilities. Until Saturday afternoon I 
could have told you truthfully that in all the thousands of families that I've come in 
contact with I have never met one who wanted to get rid of their relative. But Saturday 
I had a call from Texas from a society woman who told me that she was ashamed of her son 
he was her a lot of difficulties in her social surroundings - and if I could find 
a to put him in California she would pay up to $1,000 a month. So she has spoiled 
my statement. That is one parent who is nat concerned entirely for her son's benefit. 
Going more specifically, I would like to answer your question about whether or not 
involuntary treatment does any good. A week ago Friday, my son, who is a schizophrenic 
22 years of illness, decided that he was God. The week before he had been Jesus Christ 
and the week before that he was John the Baptist. But on this day he promoted himself 
to God. He was at a board and care horne and he began to order everyone around in the 
name of God. So his conservator called me and said we're going to send him to the has-
because he needs a little help. So he was taken ambulance to the hospital. 
He came home, then, Saturday. In this week's treatment he had some semblance of 
health. He knew what reality was. He came home Saturday and stayed with his dad and me 
for about 10 hours and he was absolutely beautiful. His treatment had been involuntary. 
His treatment was the stabilization of his medication and he was placed where he felt 
safe. He suffers from hearing voices, the voices of the devil, and somehow when he s 
behind those locked doors at CMH he feels safe and the devils go away. So I have to 
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say - and this is just the latest incident - 's been on for years - and he has 
been under conservatorship for 15 years thank God, and he is a of a per-
son who sometimes needs treatment 
We do not believe that the mental health laws in California are incorrect 
We believe that this is not the We do believe that 
some can be made in the our ill. I'd 
like to also preface my remarks 
sidered derogatory or udicial to 
I 
ill 
the sister, the aunt, the niece, the cousin and the 
I think it's very that I am before 
any of my remarks to be con-
After all I am the mother, 
of people. 
committee on diseases 
because in my family we know diseases very well. This, I say as an aside, 
is the main reason that I work so very, very hard for research, because I don't want a 
few years from now to add I am the of a 
In my work as an advocate for the in the last seven or 
eight years, I have known of numerous crises from mental illness in 
these families. I can testify without hesitation for the need for treatment for people 
who in crises lose into their own condition fail to realize that medical 
treatment help. We maintain that at certain times in the lives of some 
ill persons, because of the of their processes and the worsening 
of their symptoms, that are indeed disabled 
It is with the definition of that we find As the 
law now stands, 
that this person is unable to 
means, as you been told many, many times today, 
and shelter. This is much too 
s listie. If the were added would be no need to any 
the of the in the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act. We 
definition by adding this condition in which person as a result of a 
mental disorder, manifests severe deterioration in routine 
repeated and loss of or volitional 
and is not such care as is essential for his or her own 
I think that would take care of lot cases that you're 
deed someone needs to 
care of themselves 
I've had the 
in and take care 
, and I sure you could hear a 
evidenced by 
her actions 
or health." 
about where in-
are better able to take 
of horror stories, and 
I've also been not to tell too many horror stories, but our own son came home one 
time after he had been lost for while • disheveled, with 
lice and scabies, malnourished - and, of course, we took care of him and nursed him 
back, got him in good shape and then went to ask that his conservatorship be 
extended and that he be admitted to the ital. The j looked him over and said, 
well, you appear to be well fed, you' dressed in clean, clothes and 
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you re not malnourished. The judge did not say a word about the 
mental condition. And our , my family's has been repeated many times 
with other families. One mother told me that she had been advised to take her son to the 
court as soon as he came home- don't clean him up, don't feed him up, don't take care o 
him ust take him to court and let the j see what he looks like. Well, mothers 
mothers you can't do that. You know, 
then go to the court. 
take ca.re of your son or daughter and 
I find this ect the most of any that we deal with. I know that many 
, many families find it very, very because we're not young parents, we've 
lived a life, we've been civil , actions. I carried placards for the civil 
in the '60s. I've worked all my life for civil and freedom and it's very, 
very to me to ever say to anybody this person should lose his freedom for a while. 
I have , and believe me, remind me about the Russians and I don't want 
this to happen to my son, I want him to have every that he's capable of handling, 
and I want that for everybody else, but I'm also a realist and I think we have to be 
realistic. Mental illness does not come in a neat little It is not the same 
for 
hurt 
Mental illness manifests itself in many different ways and people are 
mental illness in varying I know all that. I the last 22 years 
in San County more with ill than with (quote, normal 
and I know the different degrees. 
I'm happy to know that there are unwanted drug treatment. I 
know what drugs can do - I've seen it. I know what tardive is. I know that 
my son tells me that when he takes mellaril he s And when you do that to a 
man you take away that man's soul, his manhood, and you do it in the name of medication. 
So I'm very happy to know that there are to be more controls, starting with Napa 
State ital, and I those controls are extended into the where people 
do not have to have medication forced upon them. However, again, this is my dilemma. 
sometimes think it's kinder to take who are in such dreadful , and the medi-
cations do help, and to have them clear their minds and take away the terrible trauma 
of severe mental illness, 
We are finding, and I'm absolutely certain that this is true, that a diagnosis of 
severe mental illness is very often not made upon the basis or the condition of that 
person, but on whether or not there are any beds or services available to that person. 
son has been on conservatorship for 15 years and when he was first taken in for con-
, it was no problem at all, even ioned whether or not he 
was going to the protection of the way, I am a very strong 
Some of the best servants I ve ever known were conserva-
and and take care of their 
I believe with all my heart that are not being I know 
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in my because the funds are not available And a person very up in the 
in San 
we have no to 
said to me 
You 
should we 
is it? So 
in wherein 
I don't 
believe that funding and money is the answer I believe that the manage-
ment that money could be more, but it's not the 
answer 
Another that I think was the j sometimes base 
their their on how well or ill the person is on his appearance at the 
time of the hearing, and if a person s been in the for a few days and medicated 
and taken care of and well fed, he' 
judge than if this had not taken 
judges do not take into account the 
And the ability of ill 
ing. We see it happen all the time. 
records, at the record of recidivism 
to make a much better appearance before that 
also true that many times we feel that the 
nature of and manic depression. 
themselves is absolutely astound-
And the j is not allowed to look back in the 
the that have been 
son's life for a long, long time, and so his decision is made And 
say that it used to be in the olden , or 
on in this per-
someone here 
to the 
hospital was granted after a 
court in my county and those 
pass them That to me 
I want to say before I close 
cates and the can 
cate for their ill 
flesh and blood. We don't want to 
We as much concerned 
relatives as anyone could 
of the state 
for our sons and 
I visited the court, the mental health 
of in one minute, not just 
Patients Advo-
the number one advo-
After all, these are our children 
want to 
and the 
're our 
rid of them. 
of our 
do want to see a mass re-
locked facilities. However we do wish 
's all we're 
We do not believe that a be 
disturbances, or delusions, and hallucinations that this is rea-
son enough for hospitalization. If such a person is not or attempting 
to cause ury or death to himself others if he's and providing 
for his food, his and shelter he should be left alone to live as he chooses. 
If he chooses to treatment, that's as his safety 
and that of others is not j I can of that that 
I know very well. I have a brother who's 78 years old and he s been schizophrenic since 
the age of 16. He has of ways. He received 
no government aid, he's now 
ago and he is still out of He is still 
life I saw him two weeks 
a much more and 
life in his world of 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRONZAN: Can he be reached by ? 
MS. TEISHER: If he's not to the President. 's never been medicated, 
s never been 
him and I 
entire 62 years of his 
left him alone He's 
life. 
harmless and he's 
a life. 
I will just summarize four I've said one - the LPS Act should be 
reviewed and revised, 
person must be evaluated 
in connection with the area. The ill 
by a medical staff with no consideration being given 
to whether or not beds and services are available. And j I don't know how the 
will tell me this is , but should be allowed to review the 
and no just make a judgment on the condition of the person. 
I have one little thing to tell you. California Alliance for the Mentally Ill 
has just completed a survey, a questionnaire that we sent out to our own people, our own 
members. 75 percent of the people who returned this questionnaire stated that involun-
treatment had been helpful to their relatives. I think that pretty well summarizes 
position. 
Thank you very much. 
CHAIR~~N MCCORQUODALE: Thank you, Ms. Teisher. All 
the Citizens Advisory Council. 
, Jack Cunningham from 
1976 
MR. JACK CUNNINGHAM: Good afternoon. I'm Jack 
to the Citizens 
Board at Napa State 
Council. I 
ital and have 
and I'm a consumer 
also the Chairman of the Governor's 
to fulfill that since 
And I am also the current Chairman of the California of State 
ital Chairpersons. 
I'm a little more intimidated than I am 
behalf of a group of 
' 
a very 
cause I will be speaking on 
ion that encompasses many 
and many of 
with as much caution and 
We chose not to write out 
that you had raised and that were 
views and 
a 
so 
, and I will to 
deal of enthusiasm if it's 
answers in a detailed way to the 
that 
in what it is we have to say 
and what we believe. We assume modestly that that will come out, that those answers, 
and elaborate at the same time, will come out of the work of the small task 
orthe task force, the small work groups within the task force. 
The Executive Committee of the Council has statement about the 
issue that we you will address within the realm of 
treatment, and we will have the program statement on the overall mental health 
, later this month, and we will submit that to you as system • we 
as possible. 
-55-
Before reading you what is the draft of a collective statement, I would, however, 
like to say something that I think. that all of the - well, it 1 s not all of the majority 
of members of the Council who are distinctive and distinct from each other in many, many 
ways, nevertheless share -and that is that the term as it to the 
mental health system in the communities and the needs to be looked at very 
and I'm afraid with a deal Because in terms of 
and and of purpose scratches surface, 
not in terms of but in terms of for mental wellness as well as sup-
port for mental health. So in around the term ,"please do 
not for a second believe that we believe that the treatment that is necessary is 
available. 
The Council wishes to go on record as stat to this body that the Council be-
lieves that the 
extent should the mental health 
to be addressed is to what 
be used to hold or control those whose behavior 
may be unusual or bizarre or even labeled deviant, but is nevertheless within the law? 
The Council recommends that the consider the of a specialized 
forensic mental health in which the purpose of the pub-
lie and in which treatment is given to persons, who because of a mental disorder, are 
judicially committed or are repeat Penal Code or felony offenders. In con-
sidering such a system, serious should be state hospitals only 
for j committed persons and sentenced diagnosed as mentally dis-
ordered who are in need of this level of care. 
forensic mental health system will need to have as a 
of the development of the 
a of the existing 
involuntary treatment 
That's theformalstatement and I would like to add to that in faith that we 
believe that LPS needs to continue to be studied in terms of the 
with the treatment of suicidal persons, those who are 
sons 
medicated. 
the 
as disabled and those need to be 
, as I said earlier, I believe and 
sentiments of the Council. that the 
I not 
does not lie 
to others, per-
too far from 
with 
LPS. You have heard from a of sources that Californians have a right to be 
self-congratulatory inasmuch as LPS is a of As a person 
who has spent a lot of time in and out of the mental health and state hospital systems, 
I consider myself in a paradoxically fortunate sort of a way that I was of an age in a 
place where these tremendous advances have occurred The , if there is ~ single 
problem, therefore does not lie with what is after all humane legislation. 
It lies with the ability of the who are decisions around language of 
suicidal persons, gravely disabled and so forth, to continue to make decisions. 
on <lll individ co11lin llv Jt•np:lrd 
underfunded system that has built into it almost ions of 
and So the seems to me, vis-a-vis the indi-
vidual who may be up or about be 
ab and sometimes, alas, the 
these words mean not mean 
of the peop 
, stems from the in-
who are responsible for 
individual cases, who as 
told this very committee before are toxic or suf from 
kind of chronic disenchantment with themselves, the tem, and the patients, 
that become innocent f you ike, but destruct a source of even more 
trouble. 
I do not wish to add my name or voice to the number of peop e outside the sys-
tem or within it who want to ain't it awful. I think it s a very time. 
I feel sure that you as lators will take the extensive of time that you will 
if you're to make any to look at all of the that have been 
said here and that will continue to be said by people who are impacted. 
If I could close with a personal note, Mr. Bronzan, I have another life and that 
is I'm Director of the Area on for Solano and counties and I've 
the pleasure o meet with your father a number of times, and I this \vould 
be my only chance to you on your choice of a parent and on the 
excellent upbr 
CllAIEl'lA.N 
DR. DEREK WASHINGTON: 
you've been able to afford him. 
Thank you, Jack. Dr. 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In these ions 
we acted on the basis that some of our responses were id if certain others were 
accepted. The or point is that now under LPS the initial ion that 
the Doe v. Gallinot , and that's a conducted after 72 hours have passed, 
the person be committed under the LPS criteria. Unfortunate there 
continuum of care available. If the person is disabled or a danger to 
r others bam! that person is in the is not he is on the street. 
number of ions are based upon the that there be a wider 
o intervention modes. I shall to this fact clear as I go 
the Mental Health Association 
Our responses are the as I will enumerate them, Under the section 
commitment criter 
criteria which are cover 
ion 1, as in any 
exact correct in all instances. 
persons, 
Such criteria or 
ultimate issue. If criteria are out in great detail 
ab should be covered the statute will not be covered. 
not intended to covered will fit criteria. 
ion one tries to t 
way to make the cri-
lines when he determines 
ften persons who 
criteria are broad, 
an area in which there 
that of with the need for a continuum of care. If a person is close 
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to the line on needing involuntary intervention, a continuum of care, which could include 
hospitals, programs, would prevent 
egregious mistakes from made. Remember, that Mental Health Association has been a 
long-time supporter of treating the ill in the community. 
An example of the of person who fall into this grey area is the mentally 
ill hostile person who comes into an office and and the 
office There is such a person at L.A. Mental Health Association. Such a 
person probably does not need but well need temporary medications 
or counseling. 
A problem does exist with LPS criteria Different counties or 
judges within the same county the standards 
the definition would help is a matter of debate. 
Whether tightening 
the courts can deal with this 
problem. What concerns the Mental Health Association is that the elasticity of the stan-
dards sometimes appears to be based upon space available in county hospitals and/or the 
financial needs of the county at that time. Basing the decision of whether to intervene 
upon such factors is improper from a mental health standpoint. 
For 2A, there are differences between 
disabled. That difference be even more if the 
defined narrowly. And treatment for the two be 
gravely 
standard were 
different. 
People contemplating suicide fall into different groups and treatment for them may be 
radically different. 
Question 2B, the real is is the for the individual and 
what type of treatment will help? Will If so, then the 
categorization of the is not relevant. Therefore, the answer to A and B is that 
there are differences, are determinative. Again, if there 
were a continuum of care, many of the would be lessened. 
Three. Although that question can be discussed in length~ the issue which 
we would like raised is whether and shelter includes 
being able to do so with third party of a friend, volunteer or even 
social service We believe that third party should be allowed and 
believe that the statute should so state. Further, if were a continuum of care, 
this third party would come into often. 
For Question 4, there is a definite need to define danger of both to self and 
others. Evidence and testimony should be taken. Questions to be raised are: 
1. How eminent must the danger be? 
2. Should the danger be restricted to danger? 
3. Should there have to be an act? If so, how much danger must be involved? 
4. Should threats to others the ability to carry them out be 
enough? 
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to the threatener He 
were a continuum of care, could the definition 
the intrusion would be less severe 
Sect B, tent here we 
where this term used e sewhere. [ 
for and the like 
person who may need to have 
for persons who are so far gone that 
their own defense. are then 
these 
be less restrictive 
into an that needs 
hat it 
mentioned 
stand trial on criminal 
questions in this section for more information than we have. We should 
or 
it. 
Under Section C, the issue is and best treatment, not 
Should there be intervention, ' it be less 
oriented if the care continuum were available. 
Nine. Because of overburdened staff, budget cutbacks and other reasons, the 
's office often cannot do a proper job. One model system which might be 
examined would be the system utilized in Kansas where there are one-to-one volunteers 
as conservators of the person but not the estate. 
? 
to COMPEER - the program came from the Old 
The program has certain similari-
Friends and in-
valves a number of volunteers It could be administered under the public 
office or some other way. Right now the 
of individualized care. 
Ten. Again, the Kansas model is a 
anyone who is 
commitment 
for a 
For Question 12, 
that's the sum of my test 
, we go back to 
do not seem to be promoting 
here. It could be considered for 
or for any of involuntary 
the continuum of care as an issue there. 
CHAIRMAN All 
' 
thank you. We your and 
That the We had several who had indicated they 
like to make some comments and we will allow some time to do that. I would like 
that their comments within the framework of whether there is a need 
review the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act and 
, Craddock first. 
DR. CHARLES CRADDOCK: This will be a 
to to the am 
f the ill homeless which in my 
related to that. We'll call on 
minute statement I the 
comments to the ques-
and that of many of the 
morning is an area which is in need of reassessment under the LPS law. 
I am not a I am an M. • I take care of who have serious 
irreversible cancer and leukemia. These and are often able to live 
fruitful and sometimes very life under medical 
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s 
It their cooperation and that is the issue that is so different with respect to 
mental disease of a serious nature. These by definition often that they are 
ill and blame their difficulties on others. Therefore, they are not amenable to a 
treatment, either in or out of hospitals, or by professionals of any kind. 
? 
There is no curage of treatment. That does not mean that they cannot live for a long 
time , just as a diabetic lives for a time even though he is not 
I have a daughter somewhat like the one that a former mentioned who is now 
36. She has been psychotic for 18 years. Under LPS no therapy of any sort other than 
very transient therapy has been available to her. She is now a street person. She's a 
bag woman or whatever definition you might wish to I don't know where she is. 
She is lost. And I consider her lost in related to LPS law because under no cir-
cumstances as long as that woman has denied her illness has any form of therapy of any 
sort mentioned here been available to her. 
Thank you very much. 
CHAIRMAN MCCORQUODALE: Thank you, Dr. Craddock. Dr. Allen? 
DR. CHARLES ALLEN: Thank you for your nobility and hanging in. I can make this 
brief. 
I believe that Section 5008 def grave disability should have one word added 
to the definition, namely "self-preservation.!! I hope that that would encompass some of 
the that Mrs. Teisher asked to be added. The reason for this is that the suicide 
commitments are not adequate to take care of many of the people who are chronically 
mentally ill. They endanger themselves seriously, continuously, habitually some of them, 
without intending to do so. But because of the mental illness they fail to seek help 
when ill. They traffic hazards, 're unable to protect them-
selves from violence and may sometimes by peculiar behavior elicit violent 
responses. The courts interpret the section on grave disability very, very literally and 
even minimal ability to provide food, clothing and shelter is considered sufficient to 
deny conservatorship. And this is a very, very discouraging event everybody who's 
concerned with the well-being of people. I believe adding this word will not increase 
the number of admissions to state hospitals, because state hospitals would really like 
to have adequate supervision in the community. And if there was adequate supervision, 
we believe that the revolving door would be less. that the people who need the care would 
at least be screened for what their long-term needs are. 
The other main thrust of my piece of paper here is in reference to security at 
the state hospitals. I believe that there should be a substantial section in each of the 
state hospitals - Metropolitan, Camarillo and Napa - that have security the equivalent of 
Atascadero. Atascadero is now caring mainly for mentally ill Penal Code and prison 
inmates Atascadero used to be the safety valve for the state hospitals when they had 
patients so violent couldn't handle them in their relatively open situation. 
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Atascadero no that service. State ho then have violent people in 
an open , and the district t like to secute ients for crimes. 
It doesn't enhance their record of vJhen not reason of insanity is 
0 and think son Ln be cared ror 
so the funds. 1 that crime and many of the continual 
crimes committed on staff and ients in state should be 
to a Penal Code commitment, and not excessive because it at least 
labels that person as an offender the criminal of the word. And 
where 're cared for is now handled is a medical facility, 
Atascadero is a very secure mental health and it was quite dis-
courag to hear that the vetoed additional mental health because 
's needed. 
Thank you very much. 
CHAIRMAN Thank you. Wanda 
MS. WANDA COVINGTON didn't realize when I submitted the written testimony 
that I would be coming up here, but I'm for the 
son became ill four years ago the first year he was home from the 
service we realized that he needed and not know how go about gett 
We checked with a t and with doctors and we learned that unless he was a dan-
ger to himself or to others or disabled that we could not do So for a 
year in our home. unable to a job watched him deteriorate. 
He started s up in the d up middle o the over 
couches not He didn threaten us didn' do that would 
us, or 
gun. He a 
us to have 
int that did 
to--that 
house, the crisis 
son, 
have to go 
committed, He a 
it got to it and 
process 's sup-
once, The sheriff's office came 
ran out had to chase our 
mental health institution. He was 
he 
this pro three times and each time he could have killed 
We went through 
else or hurt us. 
He was 
severe side And that \>Jas one of the 
sawed it of 
turn him in, he may do 
the mental health 
do. You have to 
him and t 
on medication that did have 
didn want take the 
he ahold o a rifle, had 
case. The doctor we talked to told us, 
This was a psychiatrist. 
f this. Well that's almost 
have up. Well, , we 
of weeks, and the doctor 
talked to him and told him that he would not get anymore money, he would not get anymore 
help if he didn't stay on his medication, and he had been stabilized long enough that he 
was rational. In fact, he talked to me and he said, "Mom, I don't even know what got 
into my head." He said, "All these strange things were happening." 
So what I believe is wrong with the law is there should be something put in it -
and I don't know how to say this exactly -but something should be put in the law to say 
that a person should be, when he is involuntarily committed, he should be kept long 
enough to be stabilized on the medication so that he won't have these return bouts back, 
back, back, back. It's hard on the family, it's hard on us. I'm a member of a group 
that we've all experienced similar stories. I was never physically abused but there 
are members in our group that have been abused by their loved ones, and this shouldn't be. 
He experienced mental torment, he has cried, he has sweated, he was in fear for his life 
because he was having delusions, he was having hallucinations and there wasn't really 
anything that the psychiatrist could do about it or we could do about it. 
And that's all I've got to say. 
CHAIRMAN MCCORQUODALE: All right, thank you. I think we've run out of our time, 
and we would like to urge that if you do have comments that you would like to make that 
you could still submit those to us until the 15th of October and they'll be included in 
the record. We do intend to have other hearings as I indicated earlier. Both Mr. 
Bronzan and I are well familiar with the saying that, "Fools rush in where angels fear 
to tread," and so we're not rushing in to make wholesale changes in the law. But we 
would like to encourage a formation of a group of interested people who would talk seri-
ous about the problems that exist today and try to reach some agreement among themselves 
of the different viewpoints as to what might be a constructive way to go and any changes 
that take place. We're willing to work on this as long as necessary and to the 
extent that we can provide help or assistance or support in trying to reach that accom-
modation, and we would like to see this informal group of people get together on an 
ongoing basis to discuss what might be done and what changes might take place. 
Again, we appreciate your coming today. Do you have any comments that you want 
to make? 
ASSEMBLYM&~ BRONZAN: Just one. As a housekeeping matter I'd like to thank Mike 
Desrys and Mike Orozco for the filming of this. They have videotaped this hearing as 
have all the hearings of the select committee and they're available to the public 
for free. If you want a copy, just contact us and we'll get you a copy for whatever 
purposes you have. 
Echoing your comments, Mr. Chairman, this may be the first major discussion on 
LPS in a while; it certainly isn't going to be the last. Clearly you have competing 
involved here, not the least of which is when is it too much and when is it not 
enough and when do those needs run into each other? The issue of just how far the state 
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should involve itself in is an issue that is not resolved and is not 
resolved in my own mind. And I think v.Je re not an on the LPS Act, 
but I think we are witnessing a valid that was raised in the very first--Senator 
Short' comments, and that is does a to treatment is that one of 
the r that a person has. And we haven't solved that 's hearing and we won't 
solve it for a while, but I think it's of us attention to as we look at 
the whole overall problem. 
I would just say, Mr. Chairman, that, 's to me that what domi-
nated much of today's hearing is what has dominated much 0 all the hearings and that is 
just how little is being done in in mental health in the State of California and 
how much we have to do to debase and hmv much like this are affected by it. 
CHAIRMAN MCCORQUODALE All • fine. Thank you. The is adjourned. 
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1. "L-P-S" -- The Lanterman-Petris-Short 
statute replaced the old system of indefini 
involuntary psychia c 
this 
for 
2. Short-Doyle , these sta es i 
state-county organization through ich approximately $400 million is spent 
year for the provision community mental lth services. 
3. "5150" -- code section i to be held 
involuntarily for up to 72 hours for 
tment if he or she is a danger 
gravely disabled. 
a c evaluation and/or 
a danger to others or are 
4. Danger to Self One of a invol 
Generally, th s condi on is considered to exist if a 
demonstrated suicidal symptoms, as a t of his or 
6. 
The 
mental disorder, is 
, clothing, or s 
rs in order to assess 
authorize up to 14 more 
ree c 
considered 
on his 
t for 
ry trea 
on has 
mental disorder. 
treatment. 
s threatened 
a result of a 
needs for 
in decisions. 
make 
e 
in 
se 
~ S. -- the court decision in 1977 which found that nors 
cou inVOTUntarily treated if a mental disorder was present and if they 
would be likely to benefit from treatment. 
11. In re Michael T. -- the court decision in 1982 which found that 
juvenile-courts do-not have the authority to involunta ly place minors 
are dependents (dependent, neglected, or abused) in secure treatment 
facilities., Such placement can only be done through L-P-S proceedings. 
12. Conservatorship -- A decision by a court to appoint another person 
responsible for most decisions affecting an involuntary patient's life • 
• Temporary Conservatorship -- Appointment of a conservator for up to 30 
days. 
14. Habeas Corpus -- a writ petitioning for immediate release which can be 
led by, or on behalf of, an involuntary patient. 
15. "Parens Patriae" -- the specific power of the state on behalf of 
society to protect and care for those who are considered not capable of 
caring for themselves. 
